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Theses
•	 The	 Justice	 and	 Development	 Party	 (AKP),	 which	 has	 gov-
erned	Turkey	since	2002,	has	been	engaged	in	reconstructing	
the	Republic	of	Turkey	 in	a	revolutionary	manner.	This	pro-
cess	is	highly	dynamic;	 in	2002–2016	the	state	was	being	re-
constructed	in	an	inconsistent	manner.	Furthermore,	a	broad	
spectrum	of	ideas	has	been	employed	on	the	ideological	level,	
and	the	government’s	actions	have	met	with	resistance	from	
various	 circles.	 However,	 the	 unsuccessful	 coup	 attempt	 of	
15	July	2016	marked	a	 turning	point	 in	Turkey’s	modern	his-
tory.	The	changes	that	began	at	that	time	are	irreversible,	and	
the	process	of	the	construction	of	a	New	Turkey	gained	fresh	
momentum.	
•	 The	most	 important	consequences	of	 the	 failed	coup	 include	
the	 consolidation	 of	 power	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 President	 Recep	
Tayyip	Erdoğan,	the	mobilisation	of	the	section	of	society	who	
support	him	and	the	crystallisation	of	the	canon	of	values	fun-
damental	 for	 the	New	Turkey.	The	 failed	coup	can	be	 recog-
nised	as	a	founding	myth	because	it	was	an	emotional	social	
experience	which	involved	a	large	section	of	the	public,	thus	
offering	the	government	a	new	mandate	to	rule	the	country.	
•	 The	 political	 myth	 of	 2016	marks	 the	 end	 of	 pragmatically	
drawing	 upon	 a	 broad	 spectrum	 of	 ideas	 because	 it	 defines	
a	precise	canon	of	values	 for	 the	New	Turkey.	 Its	pillars	are	
both	 the	 ideas	 that	became	widespread	under	AKP	rule	and	
the	 legacy	 of	modern	 Turkey	 reinterpreted.	The	 strength	 of	
the	new	canon	of	 ideas	was	confirmed	during	 the	campaign	
preceding	the	constitutional	referendum	in	April	2017	and	at	
the	time	of	the	vote	itself.	The	newly	created	canon	of	values	
is	coherent,	understandable	and	appealing	to	the	public.	The	
opposition	 has	 not	 developed	 any	 alternative	 version	 to	 the	
events	which	took	place	on	15	July	2016	nor	a	counter-proposal	
as	regards	identity.	Furthermore,	it	is	watching	on	helplessly	
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as	the	AKP	takes	over	its	values.	There	is	no	real	political	alter-
native	to	Erdoğan’s	government	at	present.	
•	 Turkey	is	becoming	an	even	more	difficult	partner	for	the	West	
after	 the	 attempted	 coup.	 A	 strong	 anti-Western	 and	 anti-
liberal	 trend	based	on	a	political	 system	strongly	relying	on	
one	leader	is	inherent	in	its	founding	myth.	However,	this	does	
not	mean	that	a	Turkey	with	this	kind	of	government	model	
will	automatically	become	a	close	ally	of	other	anti-Western	
countries	(such	as	Russia	or	Iran)	and	build	a	camp	with	them	
that	would	be	competitive	to	the	West.	In	this	context,	Turkey	
above	all	emphasises	 its	own	sovereignty.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	
not	looking	for	points	of	reference	in	other	countries	because	
it	is	a	model	for	itself.	
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InTroducTIon
The	Republic	of	Turkey	has	been	undergoing	a	thorough	transfor-
mation	under	the	rule	of	the	Justice	and	Development	Party	(AKP)	
since	2002.	This	paper	 is	an	attempt	 to	reconstruct	 its	 ideologi-
cal	 foundations.	The	 transformation	on	 the	 ideological	 level	 en-
tered	the	decisive	stage	after	the	coup	of	15	July	2016	which	was	
thwarted	by	supporters	of	the	government.	The	coup	is	treated	as	
a	modern	political	myth	that	is	used	by	the	government	to	build	
a	comprehensive	story	of	Turkey	under	its	rule	and	to	define	the	
fundamental	values	and	identity	of	the	state.	
The	 interpretation	of	 the	modern	political	myth	 is	based	on	 the	
classical	work	of	Ernst	Cassirer	who,	starting	from	the	definition	
of	 the	myth	 as	 a	 “collective	 desire	 personified”,	 claims	 that	 the	
myth	is	an	emotion	turned	into	an	image.	In	addition	to	this,	the	
most	essential	feature	of	such	modern	political	myths	is	the	fact	
that	 they	are	 elaborated	by	 leaders	who,	 as	part	 of	 their	moves	
aimed	at	determining	the	character	and	identity	of	the	state,	com-
bine	elements	of	emotional	and	irrational	thinking	with	the	skill	
of	 using	 them	 in	 a	 conscious	 and	 intelligent	 manner.	 Building	
a	comprehensive	story	of	the	state	cannot	be	a	matter	of	chance.1
Using	the	interpretation	of	the	political	myth	as	referred	to	above,	
an	attempt	is	made	in	this	paper	to	present	how	the	Turkish	gov-
ernment,	 equipped	with	 the	myth	 of	 the	 coup,	 has	 consciously	
capitalised	on	the	real	emotions	and	trauma	of	citizens	over	the	
past	year	to	establish	a	canonical	story	of	the	New	Turkey.	
This	 text	discusses:	 the	 ideological	 aspect	of	AKP	rule	 in	2002–
2016,	when	 this	 party	 drew	upon	 a	 broad	 spectrum	 of	 ideas	 in	
a	pragmatic	manner;	the	coup	itself	as	a	political	myth;	and	the	
main	part	of	this	analysis	is	devoted	to	discussing	the	ideological	
1	 E.	Cassirer,	The	Myth	of	the	State,	Yale	University	Press,	New	Haven	1946, 
pp.	280-282. 
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foundations	of	the	New	Turkey.	In	addition	to	the	literature	col-
lected,	press	materials	and	films	available	on	the	Internet,	papers	
concerning	the	coup	reflecting	the	official	narrative	as	well	as	in-
formation	collected	during	field	studies	in	Turkey	have	been	used	
in	this	analysis.	
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I. The AKP’s rule As A reconsTrucTIon 
of KemAlIsT TurKey 
The	rise	 to	power	 in	2002	of	 the	 Justice	and	Development	Party	
(Adalet	ve	Kalkınma	Partisi	–	AKP)	which	has	its	roots	in	the	po-
litical	Islam	tradition	can	be	recognised	as	one	of	the	most	mean-
ingful	turning	points	in	the	history	of	the	modern	Turkish	state.	
The	party	had	been	formed	a	year	before	gained	a	parliamentary	
majority	and	formed	a	cabinet	by	itself	–	it	was	the	first	time	this	
had	happened	in	Turkey	since	the	election	in	1987.2	What	was	an	
absolute	novelty	was	the	fact	that	a	parliamentary	majority	had	
been	 gained	 by	 a	 grouping	 continuing	 the	 traditions	 of	 circles	
that	openly	contested	the	secular	character	of	 the	republic	 (one	
of	their	last	political	emanations	was	the	Welfare	Party	–	Refah	
Partisi,	which	had	been	banned	in	1998).	It	also	disassociated	it-
self	 from	 the	 tradition	 of	 political	 Islam,	 creating	 an	 inclusive	
political	power	which	was	also	open	to	people	with	liberal	views	
who	were	opposed	to	the	old	Kemalist	elites.	The	party	presented	
itself	as	a	Muslim	version	of	Christian	Democrats,	treating	Islam	
as	 a	 source	 of	 inspiration.	 It	 combined	 Muslim	 religiosity	 and	
conservatism	with	the	pro-market	orientation	of	the	centre-right	
which	had	already	been	present	on	the	Turkish	political	scene.
The	AKP,	which	has	won	every	election	since	2002,	has	launched	
the	process	of	a	thorough	reconstruction	of	the	Republic	of	Tur-
key	 (which	 is	 still	underway).3	This	 reconstruction	has	brought	
such	 fundamental	 changes	 as	 the	 disassembly	 of	 the	 Kemalist	
establishment	 led	by	 the	army	and	 the	 security	 structures	 that	
2	 The	Republican	People’s	Party	(CHP)	was	the	only	other	party,	apart	from	
the	AKP	(which	garnered	32%	of	the	votes),	to	enter	parliament.	This	meant	
that	none	of	the	political	parties	that	had	been	present	in	the	Grand	National	
Assembly	of	Turkey	during	the	previous	term	managed	to	make	it	to	parlia-
ment	this	time.	This	result	and	the	subsequent	distribution	of	the	seats	were	
possible	owing	to	the	voting	regulations	setting	the	election	threshold	at	10%.
3	 Cf.	M.	Matusiak,	The	great	leap.	Turkey	under	Erdoğan, OSW Point of View,	
Warsaw,	27	May	2015,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_51_
ang_great_leap_net.pdf
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reported	to	it,	a	gradual	exchange	of	the	political,	official	and	eco-
nomic	elites	and,	to	a	certain	extent,	also	of	the	opinion-forming	
circles.	The	Turkish	government	made	all	these	changes	drawing	
upon	a	broad	 range	of	 ideas	 –	 from	democratisation	and	appre-
ciation	of	the	social	masses	through	rehabilitation	of	Islam	as	the	
most	essential	component	of	the	Turkish	culture.	This	means	that	
the	AKP	in	ideological	terms	remained	above	all	pragmatic,	and	
the	order	being	created	anew	had	no	clearly	crystallised	ideologi-
cal	assumptions.	These	were	compiled,	expressed	and	turned	into	
a	kind	of	canon	only	as	a	consequence	of	the	unsuccessful	military	
coup	of	15	July	2016.
1. The democratisation and subjectivisation of society 
The	democratisation	of	the	state	was	the	key	issue	in	the	discourse	
that	applied	at	the	beginning	of	the	AKP’s	rule.	For	this	reason	re-
placing	the	official	version	of	nationalism	which	defines	the	Turk-
ish	 nation	 as	 a	 secular	 ethnic	 community	 linked	 with	 the	 state4	
with	 a	more	 capacious,	 civic	 concept	 where	 the	 binding	 factor	 is	
Islam	 meant	 a	 fundamental	 change.	 Furthermore,	 a	 U-turn	 was	
made	on	the	level	of	the	ideological	foundations	of	the	state	as	the	
modernisation	model	applicable	until	then	was	given	up	(moderni-
sation	was	understood	as	selective	Westernisation,	although	it	was	
not	clearly	stated	as	such).	As	part	of	 this	model,	 the	conservative	
masses,	deprived	of	social,	cultural	and	economic	capital,	were	the	
subject	of	a	top-down	modernisation	that	was	being	carried	out	by	
the	 ‘enlightened’	elites.5	Under	AKP	rule,	 the	public	gained	appre-
ciation	and	was	to	become	an	important	subject	in	Turkish	politics.	
4	 This	understanding	of	the	national	community	became	entrenched	in	the	
first	years	of	the	existence	of	the	republic.	For	more	details,	see:	S.	Cagap-
tay,	Islam,	Secularism,	and	Nationalism	in	Modern	Turkey:	Who	Is	a	Turk?,	
Routledge,	London	&	New	York	2006.
5	 It	was	pointed	out	that	this	model,	which	was	perceived	as	top-down	modern-
isation,	had	become	worn	out	already	in	the	mid	1990s.	Cf.	Ç.	Keyder,	Whither	
the	project	of	modernity?	Turkey	in	the	1990s,	[in:]	S.	Bozdogan,	R.	Kasaba	
(eds.),	Rethinking	Modernity	and	National	Identity	in	Turkey,	University	of	
Washington	Press,	Seattle	1997,	pp.	37-52.	On	the	other	hand,	the	AKP	by	ap-
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Changes	 in	 the	 institutional	 order	 of	 the	 republic	 were	 being	
made	 in	 the	 same	spirit	 of	democratisation.	Turkey,	 as	 a	 candi-
date	for	EU	membership,	began	gradually	reducing	the	army’s	po-
sition.	In	turn,	the	army	had	a	hostile	attitude	towards	the	new	
government	almost	from	the	very	beginning	of	the	AKP’s	rule	and	
threatened	it	would	intervene,	viewing	this	party	as	a	threat	to	
the	secular	character	of	the	republic.	The	Turkish	army	tradition-
ally	from	the	1960s	performed	the	function	of	the	‘guardian	of	sec-
ularism’	and	reviewer	of	the	political	class.	It	interfered	directly	
on	 four	occasions	–	 staging	coups	 in	 1960	and	 1980,	and	 forcing	
the	government	to	resign	in	1971	and	1997.	The	confrontation	that	
took	place	at	the	time	of	the	election	of	Abdullah	Gül	for	president	
in	2007	turned	out	to	be	a	decisive	moment	in	the	process	of	the	
democratisation	of	the	state	and	establishing	civilian	control	over	
the	armed	forces.	One	manifestation	of	the	political	crisis	was	the	
so-called	‘e-memorandum’6	addressed	by	the	army	threatening	to	
intervene	–	it	ended	in	the	opposition	boycotting	the	presidential	
election	and	holding	a	snap	election	which	the	AKP	also	won.	As	
the	government	party	regained	its	social	mandate,	it	was	able,	in	
co-operation	 with	 the	 Nationalist	 Movement	 Party	 (Milliyetçi	
Hareket	Partisi –	MHP),	to	form	the	parliamentary	quorum7	and	
in	the	end	to	elect	Gül.	This,	in	turn,	opened	the	way	to	holding	
two	 show	 trials	 concerning	 the	 alleged	 Balyoz	 and	 Ergenekon	
preciating	the	public	and	making	efforts	to	emancipate	the	groups	that	had	
previously	been	underprivileged,	itself	created	a	modernisation	model	that	
was	also	top-down.	
6	 Cf.	K.	Öktem,	Turkey	Since	1989:	Angry	Nation,	Zed	Books,	London	&	New	
York	2011,	pp.	153-154.	The	text	of	the	so-called	‘e-memorandum’	in	Turkish	
can	be	 found	on:	https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrk_Genelkur-
may_Ba%C5%9Fkanl%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1_27_Nisan_2007_tarihli_bas
%C4%B1n_a%C3%A7%C4%B1klamas%C4%B1
7	 The	issue	of	the	required	two	thirds	of	the	votes	in	parliament	provoked	enor-
mous	controversies	already	during	the	first	attempt	to	elect	Gül.	After	the	first	
vote,	the	Constitutional	Court	ruled	that	the	presidential	election	was	invalid	
due	to	the	lack	of	a	quorum,	even	though	this	principle	had	not	previously	ap-
plied.	The	Constitutional	Court’s	decision	was	politically	motivated	and	was	
a	result	of	pressure	from	the	army	and	politicians	from	the	secular	opposition.	
During	another	attempt,	already	after	the	election	and	with	the	required	ma-
jority,	the	AKP	pushed	through	its	candidate.	Cf.	K.	Öktem,	op.	cit.,	p.	153.
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plots	during	which	representatives	of	the	army	allegedly	planned	
to	abolish	the	government.	These	actions	were	taken	by	the	gov-
ernment	 in	 co-operation	 with	 the	 Fethullah	 Gülen	 movement.	
Gülen	is	an	émigré	spiritual	leader	and	businessman	whose	influ-
ence	has	extended	to	such	key	state	institutions	as	the	judiciary	
and	the	structures	of	the	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs	(see	frame)	
under	AKP	rule.	Hundreds	of	the	most	senior	army	commanders	
received	long	prison	sentences	in	both	trials,	and	the	Act	on	the	
Turkish	Armed	Forces	(the	provisions	of	which,	according	to	the	
army’s	interpretation,	gave	it	the	right	to	intervene8)	was	amend-
ed	 in	2013.	Thus	 the	struggle	against	 the	army	being	conducted	
under	the	slogans	of	democratisation	resulted	in	its	position	being	
seriously	undermined,	and	changed	one	of	the	key	elements	of	the	
republic,	namely	the	army’s	supervision	of	the	political	class.	
2. Towards redefining identity
The	key	changes	that	have	taken	place	in	Turkey	on	the	ideological	
level	under	the	AKP	include	the	launching	of	the	painstaking	pro-
cess	of	redefining	the	Turkish	national	identity.	Principally,	since	
the	AKP	took	power	it	has	not	contested	the	ideological	guidelines	
of	 the	Republic	of	Turkey;	 it	has	however	placed	more	emphasis	
than	any	other	government	on	Turkey’s	Muslim	identity.	The	ideo-
logical	foundations	were	built	by	drawing	on	previously	existing	
concepts.	One	of	 the	key	concepts	was	 the	 so-called	 ‘Turkish-Is-
lamic	synthesis’	which,	since	the	early	1980s,	has	had	the	status	
of	a	semi-official	state	ideology.	Its	goal	was	to	reconcile	Turkish	
ethnic	identity	with	Islam.9	According	to	this	concept,	the	Turkish	
8	 J.	Wódka,	Relacje	cywilno-wojskowe.	Aspekty	instytucjonalne,	[in:]	Idem	
(ed.),	„Nowa”	Turcja.	Aspekty	polityczne,	gospodarcze	i	społeczne,	ISP	PAN,	
Warsaw	2015,	p.	128.
9	 The	‘Turkish-Islamic	synthesis’	was	a	continuation	of	the	historical	myths	
created	in	the	1930s	by	Kemalist	historiographers	who	began	searching	for	
roots	of	the	Turkish	nation	in	ancient	Central	Asia	to	undermine	the	sig-
nificance	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	In	the	1970s,	this	concept	began	to	be	sup-
plemented	by	an	Islamic	component,	which	was	manifested	in	the	way	his-
tory	began	to	be	taught	at	school.	Cf.	E.	Copeaux,	Tarih	Ders	Kitaplarında	
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identity	 is	 composed	both	of	 the	historical	 legacy	of	 the	Turkish	
nation,	whose	roots	reach	out	to	the	ancient	states	that	existed	in	
Central	Asia,	and	of	Islam,	the	religion	of	the	vast	majority	of	Turks.	
This	official	vision	of	history	was	established	because	of	the	calcu-
lations	of	the	army	which	governed	the	country	in	1980–1983	and	
was	 aimed	 at	 balancing	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 political	 left	 (for	
example,	compulsory	religion	lessons	were	introduced	at	schools	
under	military	rule).	This	identity	policy	was	continued	by	Turgut	
Özal,	the	conservative	prime	minister	and	in	1989–1993	president,	
thus	 contributing	 to	 the	 gradual	 emancipation	 of	 religious	 cir-
cles.	While	under	the	rule	of	the	army	and	then	Özal	religion	was	
treated	as	an	instrument.10	Under	the	AKP	the	idea	of	appreciating	
Islam	has	been	strongly	internalised	by	the	ruling	class,	this	being	
an	essential	novelty	in	Turkish	politics.	
Members	of	the	governing	party	and	its	most	powerful	ally,	that	
is,	the	massive	Fethullah	Gülen	Movement,	originated	from	deep-
ly	religious	circles.11	An	additional	factor	that	strengthened	their	
legitimacy	and	added	credibility	 to	 their	 identity	narrative	was	
the	fact	that	they	originated	from	the	conservative	masses	known	
as	‘black	Turks’.12	As	more	and	more	obstacles	in	EU	accession	ne-
gotiations	occurred,	the	new	elites	began	gradually	promoting	an	
(1931-1993)	 Türk	Tarih	Tezinden	Türk-İslâm	Sentezine, Çev.	A.	 Berktay,	
İ.	Yayınları,	Istanbul	2013.
10	 Özal	was	the	first	Turkish	president	in	history	to	make	the	pilgrimage	to	
Mecca.	His	piety,	otherwise	seen	as	sincere,	was	at	odds	with	the	lifestyle	of	
his	wife	Semra,	who	would	ostentatiously	go	around	with	a	glass	of	whisky	
and	smoking	cigars.	However,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	army	and	the	sec-
ular	establishment,	the	president’s	piety	did	not	pose	any	threat.	Cf. M. Hep-
er,	Islam,	Conservatism,	and	Democracy	in	Turkey:	Comparing	Turgut	Özal	
and	Recep	Tayyip	Erdoğan,	Insight	Turkey,	Vol.	15,	No.	2,	2013,	pp.	141-156.
11	 The	 incumbent	 president	Erdoğan,	 like	Özal,	was	 linked	 to	Naqshbandi	
brotherhood	(Turkish	Nakşibendi).	See:	M.	Heper,	Islam…,	op. cit.
12	 As	opposed	to	the	so-called	‘white	Turks’	originating	from	Ottoman	elites	who	
maintained	their	dominant	position	in	the	Republic.	See:	J.	White,	Muslim	Na-
tionalism	and	the	New	Turks,	Princeton	University	Press,	Princeton	and	Oxford	
2014,	pp.	46-48.	The	alternative	division	is	the	social	‘centre’	and	‘peripheries’.	
See:	Ş.	Mardin,	Center-Periphery	Relations:	A	Key	to	Turkish	Politics?,	Daedalus,	
Vol.	102,	No.	1,	Post-Traditional	Societies	(Winter,	1973),	pp.	169-190.
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identity	project	presented	 in	 the	 framework	of	 the	 ‘Neo-Ottom-
anism’	concept.	It	envisaged	the	full	rehabilitation	of	the	Ottoman	
Empire	which	had	been	discredited	by	the	republic,	and	opening	
up	Turkey	to	 the	external	world.	The	latter	of	 the	elements	was	
clearly	in	contrast	to	the	isolationism	typical	of	Kemalist	Turkey.	
The	government’s	mandate	was	additionally	strengthened	by	the	
improvement	of	the	economic	situation,	the	civilisational	leap	for-
ward	and,	as	a	consequence,	the	opening	up	of	new	ways	to	social	
advancement	for	previously	underprivileged	sections	of	society.	
The	process	of	the	gradual	and	thorough	redefinition	of	identity	
that	 has	 been	 taking	 place	 in	 the	New	 Turkey	which	 has	 been	
in	 formation	 since	 2002	can	 be	 recognised	 as	 revolutionary	 (in	
terms	of	the	depth	of	the	changes	and	not	their	suddenness).	The	
new	elites	have	become	so	 strong	 that	 restoring	 the	 republic	 in	
the	shape	that	existed	before	AKP	rule	is	practically	impossible.	
This	does	not	mean	that	the	hegemony	of	the	governing	party	and	
the	personal	power	of	Erdoğan	himself	(who	has	served	as	presi-
dent	 since	 2014)	 have	 been	 unchallenged.	 A	 schism	 among	 the	
elites	was	seen	in	2013,	one	manifestation	of	which	was	prosecu-
tors	linked	to	the	Gülen	movement	bringing	to	light	a	corruption	
scandal	involving	the	then	Prime	Minister	Erdoğan	and	members	
of	his	cabinet.	Another	manifestation	of	the	conflict	between	the	
AKP	and	the	circles	linked	to	its	former	ally	was	the	unsuccess-
ful	military	coup	of	15	July	2016	at	the	time	of	which	a	section	of	
the	army	who,	according	to	the	government,	were	linked	to	Gülen	
made	an	attempt	to	overthrow	the	government.	
Further	purges	in	the	army,	state	apparatus	and	education	sector	
were	one	consequence	of	the	attempted	coup.	This	time	they	were	
conducted	 on	 an	 unprecedented	 scale.13	 In	 turn,	 on	 the	 ideologi-
cal	level,	the	coup	made	it	possible	to	combine	into	one	consistent	
story	the	ideas	the	AKP	had	thus	far	been	juggling	by	pursuing	its	
13	 Around	 40,000	people	 have	 been	 arrested,	 over	 100,000	fired,	 around	
2,000	education	facilities	and	foundations	have	been	closed.
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pragmatic	policy	and	really	changing	the	state	on	the	institutional	
level.	The	coup	added	a	mythical	dimension	 to	 the	 revolutionary	
and	irreversible	changes.	Since	the	events	of	15	July	2016	came	as	
a	shock	to	the	greater	part	of	the	Turkish	public,	the	character	of	the	
coup	as	a	founding	myth	became	even	stronger	because	it	touched	
strong	emotions	that	were	experienced	in	reality.	This	is	a	turning	
point	in	the	construction	of	the	New	Turkey	and	a	point	of	no	re-
turn	–	it	appears	that	the	alternative	in	the	form	of	a	military	gov-
ernment	has	been	finally	discredited	and	the	circles	linked	to	the	
government’s	former	ally	have	been	defined	as	the	greatest	threat.	
The fethullah Gülen movement (cemaat) 
A movement centred around the Turkish spiritual leader 
Fethullah Gülen (born in 1941). It has no official structure but 
operates in a coordinated manner. The movement’s operation 
extends to such areas as: education (until 2016, Cemaat’s edu-
cation facilities were located in over 180 countries), business 
(it has owned banks and entire holdings, including companies 
controlling entities operating in the media sector) and politics. 
The beginnings of the movement date back to the 1970s and 
1980s. Cemaat is a movement of a religious and social char-
acter. It calls for a religious and moral revival and also toler-
ance, dialogue between religions, the market economy and 
liberal democracy. Its operation in Turkey was aimed above all 
at educating modern Muslim elites that would be politically, 
socially and economically active, and capable of transforming 
the Turkish republic. In 2002–2013, the movement operated in 
close alliance with the AKP. Its members worked for the state 
apparatus (government agencies, the judiciary, structures 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Prosecutors and judges 
linked to Cemaat conducted the Ergenekon and Balyoz in 
close co-operation with the government (in 2008–2012) which 
ended up in dismissing or handing down lengthy prison sen-
tences to respectively 254 and 325 high-ranking military of-
ficers, as well as businessmen and civilian servants. In 2016,  
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the Supreme Court ruled that both of these had been show tri-
als and the evidence had been fabricated. 
An open conflict broke out between Cemaat and the AKP gov-
ernment in December 2013. The schism took place as a result 
of intensifying frustration inside the movement resulting 
from Erdoğan’s increasing dominance in the state. Prosecu-
tors linked to Gülen revealed a corruption scandal in which 
members of the cabinet which was then led by Erdoğan were 
involved. Corruption charges were also brought against the 
prime minister himself and his son. Since that time, the Turk-
ish government has been ruthlessly combating the movement 
(for example, in 2015 and at the beginning of 2016, two hold-
ings owned by Cemaat were placed into receivership, and the 
country’s largest daily, Zaman, was taken over). Shortly before 
the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, the general staff reportedly 
informed the government that hundreds of members of the 
officer corps had been identified as Gülen’s supporters. This 
struggle reached its peak on 15 July.
Gülen	has	been	resident	in	the	United	States	since	1999.	His	teach-
ings	are	a	synthesis	of	Sufism	and	Turkish	nationalism.	Member-
ship	of	his	movement	is	informal	and	is	based	on	following	the	
teachings	of	 the	 leader	and	obedience	 to	 those	who	are	higher	
in	the	hierarchy	of	the	movement.	Its	members	predominantly	
originate	from	the	lower	layers	of	society,	and	joining	the	move-
ment	offered	them	the	opportunity	to	receive	an	education	and	
facilitated	their	professional	career.	They	are	obliged	to	offer	10%	
of	their	income	to	the	community.	Secular	and	Western	critics	
accuse	Cemaat	of	having	a	hidden	agenda	as	part	of	which	the	it	
allegedly	intends	to	repeal	the	secular	character	of	the	republic	
of	Turkey,	 and	also	of	 anti-Semitism.	The	Turkish	government	
recognises	Cemaat	as	a	terrorist	organisation	(Fethullahçı	Terror	
Örgütü	–	FETÖ)	that	has	been	forming	a	‘parallel	state’	for	many	
years.	According	to	Islamist	critics	of	the	movement,	these	cir-
cles	back	Israel	and	are	a	real	tool	in	US	policy	on	Turkey.
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II.  The couP ATTemPT As The foundInG 
myTh of The new TurKey 
1. A coup turned into a political myth
The	attempt	to	overthrow	Erdoğan’s	government	made	on	15	July	
2016	by	a	 section	of	 the	army	was	 the	most	 serious	upheaval	 in	
Turkish	 politics	 since	 the	 last	 coup	 in	 1980.	 The	 unsuccessful	
coup	 resulted	 in	 a	 sudden	 intensification	 of	 the	 political	 strug-
gle.	 In	 turn,	 the	 coup	 itself	 has	 provoked	 numerous	 controver-
sies.14	In	the	context	of	Turkey’s	transformation	under	the	AKP’s	
rule	 discussed	 in	 this	 paper,	 the	most	 important	 is	 the	 official	
version	of	 the	developments	promoted	by	 the	government.	This	
version	shows	the	mythical	character	of	the	developments	in	July	
2016	which	are	turning	into	a	symbolic	birth	of	the	New	Turkey.	
The	coup	is	presented	as	the	most	important	turning	point	in	the	
process	of	reconstruction	of	 the	state	and	the	redefinition	of	 its	
identity.
The	developments	of	July	2016	are	turning	into	a	political	myth	be-
cause	certain	meanings	have	been	attached	to	them	and	because	
Erdoğan	and	his	inner	circle	are	elaborating	an	official	narrative	
that	plays	on	emotions	 that	were	 really	experienced	 in	 connec-
tion	with	belonging	to	the	national	community	and	also	with	the	
attitude	to	the	Turkish	state.	The	image	of	the	community,	which	
is	consciously	being	built	on	these	developments,	fits	in	with	the	
14	 There	is	no	hard	evidence	that	the	coup	was	inspired	by	Gülen	himself,	al-
though	it	appears	to	be	indisputable	that	his	supporters	participated	in	it.	
Furthermore,	the	secular	opposition	has	highlighted	some	unclear	threads	
in	the	investigation,	even	claiming	that	the	government	might	have	known	
about	and	managed	the	coup.	These	claims	were	raised	in	the	most	open	man-
ner	by	the	leader	of	the	Republican	People’s	Party	(CHP),	Kemal	Kılıçdaroğlu.	
He	was	the	first	to	tackle	this	issue	above	all	for	the	needs	of	the	campaign	
ahead	of	the	referendum	concerning	the	introduction	of	the	presidential	sys-
tem.	Nevertheless,	this	was	the	first	act	of	open	contestation	of	the	version	of	
events	promoted	by	the	government.	See:	R.	Arslan,	Kılıçdaroğlu:	15	Temmuz	
kontrollü	darbe	girişimidir,	BBC	Türkçe, 2	April	2017,	http://www.bbc.com/
turkce/haberler-turkiye-39478777	
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definition	 of	 the	modern	 political	myth	 presented	 in	 the	 intro-
duction.	Firstly,	the	emotions	experienced	by	the	masses	and	the	
sacrifice	have	been	transformed	into	a	specific	image,	a	canonical	
story	that	includes	a	vision	of	the	state,	nation	and	leadership,	and	
the	significance	of	 sovereignty.	All	 this	creates	a	clear	vision	of	
a	Turkey	thoroughly	reconstructed	under	AKP	rule.	Secondly,	the	
tools	the	government	has	at	disposal	are	crucial	for	creating	this	
vision:	the	media	it	controls	and	the	ability	to	hold	rallies	attended	
by	thousands	of	people	during	which	government	leaders	(above	
all	 the	 president)	 have	 direct	 contact	with	 their	 supporters.	 In	
this	manner	the	close	community	between	the	government	and	
the	public	 is	manifested,	 revealing	 they	 are	 connected	 through	
a	shared	heroic	experience.	President	Erdoğan,	alongside	the	en-
tire	government	elite,	can	be	recognised	as	a	leader	who	skilfully	
manages	the	emotions	of	the	masses.
The	myth	of	the	prevented	coup	is	becoming	a	founding	myth	be-
cause	it	defines	the	fundamental	values	on	which	the	new	order	
(being	created	since	2002)	is	based.	These	values	are	defined	on	
the	basis	of	specific	events	that	took	place	during	one	night.	They	
include	heroism	and	sacrifice.	All	this	in	the	months	that	followed	
the	coup	was	expressed	 in	numerous	commemorations,	 such	as	
posters	with	photographs	of	those	killed	seen	in	city	streets,	re-
naming	the	Bosphorus	Bridge	in	Istanbul	and	the	Kızılay	under-
ground	station	in	Ankara	as	‘15	July	Martyrs’	and,	finally,	the	re-
moval	of	the	Atatürk	monument	in	Rize	(where	Erdoğan’s	family	
originates	 from)	and	plans	 to	 replace	 it	with	a	monument	 com-
memorating	the	victims.15
15	 This	case	still	does	not	equate	to	a	systemic	campaign	targeted	against	images	
of	Atatürk,	which	are	widespread	in	Turkish	public	space.	Nevertheless,	the	
fact	that	this	change	has	been	made	in	the	city	from	which	the	incumbent	
president	comes	may	be	treated	as	a	sign	of	changes	in	remembrance	policy	
or,	at	least,	as	a	test	for	the	direction	of	reforms	being	carried	out	in	this	area.	
Rize’de	Atatürk	anıtı	kaldırıldı,	yerine	’15	Temmuz	Şehitler’	anıtı	konulacak,	
Diken,	22	December	2016,	http://www.diken.com.tr/rizede-ataturk-aniti-
kaldirildi-yerine-15-temmuz-sehitler-aniti-konulacak/	
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According	 to	 the	 official	 narrative,	 what	 should	 be	 recognised	
as	unquestionable	values	and	 the	key	achievements	of	 the	New	
Turkey	under	construction	were	defended	during	the	coup.	These	
include:	democracy	(a	legally	elected	government	was	defended),	
the	sovereignty	of	the	nation	(people	took	to	the	streets	to	defend	
their	subjectivity	by	themselves),	the	legitimacy	of	the	leadership	
(which	belongs	to	Erdoğan	alone	who	leads	the	country	as	a	sove-
reign),	civilisational	progress	(that	would	have	been	thwarted	by	
the	plotters	of	the	coup	who	were	guided	by	their	individual	inter-
ests)	and,	finally,	the	fatherland	and	the	nation	(closely	linked	to	
one	another	and	traditionally	strongly	sacralised	in	Turkey).	Thus	
the	coup	myth	reveals	the	defenders	and	the	enemies	of	the	New	
Turkey.	To	thwart	the	coup,	it	was	necessary	to	make	a	sacrifice,	
but	at	 the	same	time	this	makes	 it	possible	 to	finally	determine	
what	the	order	being	built	is.	
2. The attempted coup of 15 July – the official version
The	official	version	of	 the	events	of	 15	July	2016,	 in	 factographic	
terms,	 does	not	 differ	much	 from	what	has	 been	 reconstructed	
on	the	basis	of	 independent	sources.	The	mythical	dimension	of	
the	 coup	and	 its	 failure	 is	manifested	 in	 the	official	 interpreta-
tion	 propagated	 by	 both	 the	 government	 in	 various	 statements	
and	the	pro-government	media.16	This	version,	elaborated	in	the	
weeks	 that	 directly	 followed	 the	 unsuccessful	 attempt	 to	 take	
over	power	has	become	entrenched	and	has	since	then	been	only	
slightly	corrected.	
In	 the	 official	 narrative,	 the	 coup	 began	 on	 Friday	 15	July.	The	
general	staff	received	information	about	a	planned	conspiracy	at	
16	 Examples	of	this	include	the	following	publications:	July	15:	Gülenist	Coup	
Attempt,	Report,	Daily	Sabah	Center	for	Policy	Studies,	Issue	3,	July	2016,	
http://i.tmgrup.com.tr/dailysabah/2016/08/04/f4594dbe-dfce-4fa8-a47c-
d2a3a83b67ba/1470290089676.pdf,	Temmuz	2016.	Dakika	Dakika	FETÖ’nün	
Darbe	Girişimi,	Anadolu	Ajansi	2016	(published	in	co-operation	with	Turkish	
Airlines).	
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around	4	p.m.	The	coup	plotters	were	acting	in	haste	because	their	
plans	had	been	revealed	by	the	National	Intelligence	Organisation	
(MIT).	This	is	why	the	main	action	began	at	around	10	p.m.	and	
not	overnight	as	had	been	planned.	They	occupied	strategic	loca-
tions	 in	 Istanbul	and	Ankara,	 such	as	bridges	over	 the	Bospho-
rus,	Atatürk	Airport	 in	 Istanbul	 and	General	 Staff	buildings	 in	
Ankara.	The	airspace	of	Turkey’s	two	largest	cities	was	controlled	
by	units	of	 rebellious	air	 forces.	Additionally,	military	 facilities	
in	Ankara	and	intelligence	headquarters	were	attacked,	and	the	
chief	 of	 staff	was	 taken	hostage.	Around	midnight,	 the	plotters	
stormed	 into	 the	building	of	 the	national	 television	TRT,	where	
they	forced	the	announcer	to	read	a	statement	from	the	newly	es-
tablished	Peace	at	Home	Council	(Yurtta	Sulh	Konseyi).17	
The	plotters	argued	that	the	legal	order	of	the	republic	was	being	
regularly	 and	 permanently	 violated	 under	 the	 present	 govern-
ment.	In	their	opinion,	AKP	rule	leads	to	an	escalating	erosion	of	
the	state	and	poses	a	 threat	 to	 the	principle	of	 secularity	of	 the	
republic	and	the	entire	 legal	order.	Furthermore,	 it	antagonises	
the	public	by	intensifying	religious	and	ethnic	feuds	and,	finally,	
causes	internal	destabilisation,	one	manifestation	of	which	is	in-
creasing	terrorism.18	The	council	established	by	the	plotters,	ac-
cording	to	their	rhetoric,	was	expected	to	guard	all	the	values	that	
had	been	trampled	underfoot	under	AKP	rule.	The	council	itself,	
representing	values	of	a	universal	nature,	followed	the	rule	estab-
lished	by	the	founder	of	 the	Republic	of	Turkey,	Mustafa	Kemal	
Atatürk	‘Peace	at	Home,	Peace	in	the	World’	(Yurtta Sulh, Cihan’da 
Sulh),	which	served	as	an	inspiration	for	its	name.19
17	 See:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QF3ngGDZT64	
18	 Ibid.
19	 The	name,	like	the	quoted	maxim,	was	a	reference	to	the	first	years	of	the	
republic’s	operation.	They	were	expressed	in	the	Turkish	that	was	in	use	
before	the	language	reform,	which	was	intended	to	strengthen	the	symbolic	
aspect	of	the	putschists’	actions.	The	fundamental	principles	and	values	of	
the	Republic	of	Turkey	reportedly	had	the	‘purest’	form	in	its	first	years	of	
existence.	
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The	attempt	to	take	over	power	was	thwarted	as	a	result	of	the	
massive	mobilisation	of	the	government’s	supporters	which	was	
possible	 owing	 to	 the	 dramatic	 address	made	 by	 the	 president	
via	mobile	phone	soon	after	his	escape	from	the	Marmaris	resort	
where	 he	was	 on	 holiday.20	 According	 to	 the	 official	 narrative,	
the	president	left	the	hotel	only	15	minutes	before	the	putschists	
who	 intended	 to	capture	him	were	 scheduled	 to	break	 into	 the	
room.	Additionally,	 appeals	were	made	 from	minarets	 for	peo-
ple	to	take	to	the	streets	in	Turkey’s	largest	cities.	It	had	already	
been	announced	by	 then	that	 the	coup	had	not	been	plotted	by	
the	whole	army	but	only	by	one	of	its	rebellious	parts	which	was	
inspired	by	 the	Gülen	Movement,	Erdoğan’s	bitterest	 enemy	at	
present.	The	appeal	in	which	the	president	asked	the	entire	na-
tion	to	defend	the	government	from	the	conspirators	resulted	in	
massive	demonstrations	in	protest	against	the	coup.	In	this	way	
soldiers	who	had	to	carry	out	the	orders	of	the	organisers	of	the	
coup	faced	the	dilemma	of	whether	they	should	shoot	citizens	of	
their	own	country.	
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 attempt	 to	 take	 over	 power,	 249	people	were	
killed	 and	 over	 2,000	were	 injured.	 The	 putschists	 also	 bom-
barded	 the	parliament	where	deputies	 from	all	political	parties	
were	 gathered.	 Each	 of	 the	 groupings	 immediately	 condemned	
the	coup,	and	the	soldiers	were	gradually	being	disarmed	by	the	
protesting	crowds	and	began	to	surrender.	The	coup	attempt	was	
finally	over	in	the	morning	on	16	July,	and	the	chief	of	staff	was	
freed	at	around	8	a.m.	Isolated	pockets	of	rebellion	still	survived	
one	day	longer	in	bases	in	cities	in	eastern	Turkey	(Malatya	and	
Kars)	which	had	been	meant	to	provide	support	to	the	actions	in	
Istanbul	and	Ankara.	
20	 Recording	of	Erdoğan’s	appeal:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D4D-
56etTJJI	
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3. What does the official version imply?
The	thorough	reconstruction	of	the	Turkish	state	underway	since	
2002	and	the	appreciation	of	the	public	which	indirectly	resulted	
from	it	had	previously	been	taking	place	as	part	of	the	dynamic	
but	 also	 painstaking	 process	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘passive	 revolution’.21	
The	change	happening	through	permanent	political	struggle	and	
the	social	and	economic	processes	that	have	taken	place	over	the	
past	fifteen	years	could	not	be	manifested	 in	 the	 form	of	a	con-
crete	event	that	would	symbolise	what	Turkey	and	it	its	citizens	
have	gone	through	since	the	AKP	took	power.	Immediately	after	
the	coup	was	crushed,	Erdoğan	himself	called	it	a	‘gift	from	God’	
which	could	be	interpreted	in	many	ways.	However,	the	most	es-
sential	 in	 the	 context	 that	 interests	us	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 coup	
finally	discredited	the	enemy	and	equipped	the	government	with	
a	concrete	symbol	of	its	struggle	for	the	New	Turkey	and	the	abil-
ity	 to	 compile	 the	 fundamental	 ideas	 on	which	 it	 can	be	based.	
These	ideas	are,	above	all,	unity	of	the	state	and	nation,	the	lead-
ership	inseparably	linked	with	them,	rhetorical	enmity	towards	
the	West	and,	above	all,	a	clearly	defined	domestic	enemy.	
The	official	version	of	the	coup	presents	the	events	of	15	July	above	
all	as	a	rebellion	of	a	small	section	of	the	army	that	was	carried	
out	hastily	because	the	conspiracy	had	been	disclosed	by	the	MIT.	
The	group’s	actions	were	inspired	by	Gülen	who,	should	the	coup	
have	 been	 successful,	 was	 planning	 a	 triumphal	 return	 from	
emigration	in	the	USA,	just	like	the	arrival	of	Ayatollah	Ruhollah	
21	 This	process	was	noticed	already	towards	the	end	of	the	preceding	decade	
when	changes	resulting	from	the	subjectivisation	of	the	lower,	principally	
conservative	and	religious	layers	of	Turkish	society,	became	visible.	These	
changes	resulted	from	the	AKP’s	mobilisation	of	religious	circles,	and	they	
have	taken	place	both	on	the	symbolic	level	and	as	a	consequence	of	Turkey	
fully	entering	the	mechanisms	of	the	global	market	economy.	See:	C.	Tuğal,	
Passive	Revolution.	Absorbing	Islamic	Challenge	to	Capitalism,	Stanford	Uni-
versity	Press,	Stanford	2009.
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Khomeini	to	Iran	in	1979.22	The	fact	that	Gülen	lives	in	Pennsylva-
nia,	 and	Washington	has	 refused	 to	 extradite	him,	 additionally	
strengthens	the	anti-Western	aspect	of	the	government’s	rhetoric	
which,	 in	turn,	 is	an	essential	component	of	the	founding	myth	
of	the	New	Turkey.	The	anti-Western	approach	expressed	in	the	
myth	is	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	Western	states	have	failed	to	
offer	due	support	to	the	government	and,	furthermore,	they	will	
not	accept	the	fact	that	the	coup	attempt	was	inspired	by	the	Gül-
en	Movement.	This	concept	has	been	both	employed	by	the	gov-
ernment	and	expressed	in	grassroots	initiatives.	
Statements	given	by	the	former	aide-de-camp	of	the	chief	of	staff	
have	 been	 presented	 as	 the	 key	 and	 main	 proof	 that	 the	 coup	
was	 staged	 by	 the	 Gülen	 Movement.	 He	 admitted	 that	 he	 had	
met	members	of	the	movement	towards	the	end	of	the	1980s	and	
had	since	 then	been	supported	by	 them	on	subsequent	 levels	of	
his	military	career.	He	successfully	concealed	his	links	with	the	
movement,	 thus	 avoiding	 repressions	 he	 would	 have	 suffered	
from	the	Kemalist	circles	predominant	in	the	army.23	The	coup	is	
presented	as	a	treasonable	attempt	made	by	the	president’s	bitter-
est	enemy,	which	removes	the	odium	from	the	army	per	se.	The	
symbols	employed	by	the	conspirators	and	the	references	to	the	
first	republic	thus	became	defiled.	Thus	this	is	treated	as	illicit,	if	
not	‘blasphemous’	use	of	the	symbols	that	are	the	foundations	of	
the	Turkish	Armed	Forces	by	the	circles	which	previously	ruth-
lessly	combated	the	army.	
The	 drama	 inherent	 in	 Erdoğan’s	 escape	 and	 his	 subsequent	
speech	broadcast	by	the	commercial	TV	station	CNN	Türk	is	espe-
cially	strongly	emphasised.	Combining	the	dramatic	story	of	the	
president	 and	his	 supporters	who	made	 the	highest	 sacrifice	 in	
22	 July	15…,	op. cit.	
23	 Cf.	the	profile	of	a	putschist	developed	on	the	website	of	the	pro-governmen-
tal	daily	Yeni Şafak, http://www.yenisafak.com/15temmuz/levent-turkkan-
itiraflar	
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defence	of	the	democratically	elected	government	helps	build	the	
image	of	the	unity	of	the	leader	and	the	nation,	the	most	vivid	and	
dramatic	manifestation	of	which	is	joint	resistance	to	the	tyranny	
a	successful	coup	would	reportedly	bring.	
According	to	the	official	narrative,	thwarting	the	coup	of	15	July	
is	an	undeniable	 triumph	of	both	 the	Turkish	nation	and	of	 the	
state	and	its	leader	which	are	closely	linked	to	the	nation.	The	na-
tion	won	 thanks	 to	 its	 readiness	 to	make	 the	greatest	 sacrifice,	
and	the	president	is	presented	as	a	heroic	leader.24	Thwarting	the	
coup	also	means	the	triumph	of	the	Turkish	state	and	its	institu-
tions.	This	is	proven	by	the	role	played	by	the	intelligence	services	
in	disclosing	the	conspiracy,	and	the	loyal	section	of	the	army,	po-
lice	and	gendarmerie	which	also	played	a	key,	if	not	particularly	
highlighted,	role	in	crushing	the	coup.	
24	 The	official	narrative	built	this	way	is	also	reflected	in	works	created	after	
the	coup	and	published	on	social	media.	One	example	is	the	work 15 July De-
mocracy March by	Hanefi	Söztutan,	the	recording	of	which	between	3	Au-
gust	2016	and	8	June	2017	was	watched	on	YouTube	over	9,825,000	times.	See	
translation	of	the	lyrics:
”On the hot night of 15 July,
The treacherous rebellion set the country on fire,
Then the whole nation stood up,
All families, old and young, took to the streets,
A blow to democracy was dealt, the nation was taken by surprise,
Since now liberty or humiliation!
The sound of millions of feet shook this place,
Hands holding the flags, mouths shouting takbir (‘God is great!’ – M. C.), they 
rushed ahead,
We are the witnesses of the epos of democracy!
We are the martyrs whose deaths raise from the dead another thousand!
The chief commander gave the order: Take to the streets!
Take the flags, defend the Holy Fatherland!
In the name of the love of the Nation, the Fatherland and God we stood eye to eye 
with death,
The whole world was dismayed seeing this,
The traitors sowing death from land and sky,
A multitude of souls faced death flying flags,
One lay his head in the path of a tank, another in front of a barrel,
Once again screaming in defence of democracy”
	 The	 recording	 is	 available	 on	 the	 website:	 https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=amucDzLL2IY	
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The	mythical	dimension	of	resistance	to	the	illicit	takeover	of	pow-
er	in	the	state	by	a	force	that	principally	contradicted	the	values	
that	were	defended	began	to	emerge	 immediately	after	 the	situ-
ation	had	been	brought	under	control.	A	mass	rally	was	held	on	
Sunday,	17	July	in	Istanbul	during	which	speeches	were	given	by	
the	leaders	of	all	political	parties	(with	the	exception	of	the	pro-
Kurdish	People’s	Democratic	Party	–	HDP),	 the	chief	of	staff	and	
the	president.	The	rally	was	a	manifestation	of	the	unity	of	the	na-
tion	and	the	state.	Since	this	moment,	the	government’s	attempts	
to	turn	the	coup	into	one	of	the	key	and	most	heroic	deeds	in	the	
history	of	the	Turkish	nation	have	been	repeated	on	various	occa-
sions.	In	this	story,	the	crushing	of	the	coup	is	placed	in	the	same	
rank	as	the	 independence	war	(the	victory	 is	commemorated	on	
30	August),	the	setting	up	of	the	republic,	and	a	number	of	Turk-
ish	 triumphs	seen	 throughout	 the	entire	history	of	 the	Republic	
of	Turkey	and	the	Ottoman	Empire.	In	this	discourse,	15	July	is	to	
be	recognised	as	an	event	the	scale	and	heroism	of	which	matches	
all	 these	triumphs,	 including	the	conquest	of	Constantinople.	 Its	
impact	as	a	myth	becomes	even	stronger	since	for	many	it	contains	
the	element	of	their	own	heroic	experience.	This,	in	the	conditions	
of	the	currently	created	New	Turkey,	is	expected	to	cause	a	wide-
spread	internalisation	of	the	symbols	and	values	inherent	in	it.	
4. Rabia – the New Turkey in four fingers
The	unity	of	the	nation	and	the	state,	as	well	as	the	character	of	the	
New	Turkey	is	manifested	through	simple	but	capacious	and	equiv-
ocal	symbols.	The	main	one	of	these	is	Rabia,	a	gesture	borrowed	
from	Egypt	as	a	reference	to	the	protests	of	supporters	of	the	Mus-
lim	Brotherhood	overthrown	by	the	army	in	2013.	This	gesture	was	
in	use	before	but	it	has	gained	additional	strength	since	the	coup.	
Rabia is	expressed	by	stretching	out	four	fingers	of	the	right	palm25	
25	 In	Arabic	‘Rabia’	means	four,	and	the	name	of	the	gesture	originates	from	the	
name	of	the	Rabaa	al-Adawiya	square	in	Nasr,	Egypt,	where	the	protests	of	
supporters	of	the	overthrown	government	and	President	Muhammad	Morsi	
began	in	2013.
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and	has	gained	a	new	meaning	in	the	Turkish	context.	Erdoğan	and	
his	aides	claim	that	Rabia	signifies	‘One	Nation,	One	Flag,	One	Fa-
therland,	One	State’	(Turkish	Tek Millet, Tek Bayrak, Tek Vatan, Tek 
Devlet).	The	gesture	itself	appeared	in	Turkey	after	the	overthrow	
of	 the	 Egyptian	 government	 and	was	 used	 as	 a	manifestation	 of	
the	 Turkish	 government’s	 solidarity	 with	 the	 Muslim	 Brother-
hood.	 Immediately	 after	 the	 coup,	 the	 government	 embarked	 on	
entrenching	the	official	 interpretation,	which	has	re-emerged	on	
many	occasions	during	President	Erdoğan’s	rallies	throughout	the	
campaign	preceding	the	referendum	in	April.	According	to	this	in-
terpretation,	‘One	Nation’	is	the	indivisible	and	supra-ethnic	com-
munity.	‘One	Flag’	–	its	red	colour	is	the	blood	of	the	martyrs	killed,	
and	the	crescent	and	the	star	signify	 independence.	 ‘One	Father-
land’	is	above	all	the	land	sanctified	with	the	blood	of	the	martyrs.	
‘One	State’	means	 the	government	and	 its	apparatus	which	must	
remain	strong,	united	and	undivided	to	resist	 the	attempts	of	 its	
enemies.26	
The	new	order	 interpreted	 this	way	 is	 expected	 to	be	a	distinc-
tive	 feature	 of	 present-day	Turkey.	 Borrowing	 a	motif	 originat-
ing	from	the	Middle	East	and	its	Turkish	interpretation	have	two	
overriding	goals.	Firstly,	Rabia	 is	a	manifestation	of	opening	up	
to	the	region.	The	fact	 that	 it	has	been	borrowed	precisely	from	
Egypt	 is	 expected	 to	 show	 the	 inalterability	 of	 Ankara’s	 policy	
towards	 the	 region.27	This	 means	 above	 all	 solidarity	 with	 the	
Brotherhood	itself	but	also	supports	Turkey’s	appeal	to	establish	
political	patronage	over	 the	Sunni	residents	of	 the	Middle	East.	
Secondly,	the	Rabia	gesture	is	being	nationalised	owing	to	the	in-
terpretation	where	 the	 four	 fingers	 signifying	 unity	 symbolise	
26	 See	 the	 recording	of	 the	 rally:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=	q	WI-
r	_tWrKbE
27	 For	the	ideological	framework	and	Ankara’s	determination	in	implementing	
the	guidelines	of	this	policy	regardless	of	adversities	see:	S.	Ananicz,	Alone	
in	virtue.	The	‘New	Turkish’	ideology	in	Turkey’s	foreign	policy,	OSW Point 
of View,	Warsaw,	27	April	2015,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/
pw_49_ang_alone-in-virtue_net.pdf	
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ideas	internalised	by	Turkish	society.	Thus	Rabia	is	a	symbol	that	
brings	together	the	national	idea	and	religion.	Thus	it	refers	to	the	
potential	represented	by	Islam,	the	religion	of	most	Turks.	All	this	
is	 supposed	 to	make	 the	 republic	 governed	by	 the	AKP	distinct	
from	the	old	order	which	has	been	consistently	undergoing	disas-
sembly	by	the	party	and	its	leader	since	they	came	to	power.	The	
Islamic	 interpretation	 of	 Turkish	 identity	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 the	
main	binding	factor	for	the	heterogeneous	society	and	the	main	
interpretation	 factor	 for	 the	 ideas	which	are	 the	 foundations	of	
the	New	Turkey.	
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III. The PIllArs of The new TurKey 
The	government	wants	post-coup	Turkey	 to	be	an	 ‘improved’	ver-
sion	of	the	republic.	Equipped	with	a	new	founding	myth,	the	gov-
ernment	has	embarked	on	actions	aimed	at	strengthening	the	myth	
and,	 along	with	 it,	 completing	 the	 transformation	of	national	 and	
state	identity.	The	campaign	preceding	the	referendum	concerning	
the	amendment	of	the	constitution	and	the	introduction	of	the	presi-
dential	system	was	the	most	important	test	for	the	new	language	and	
way	of	speaking	about	the	New	Turkey.	During	the	campaign,	the	
public	was	mobilised	to	build	a	new	order	by	drawing	upon	a	number	
of	fundamental	values	and	ideas	on	which	it	is	supposed	to	be	based.	
The	New	Turkey	has	no	 codified	 rules	 unlike	 the	 early	Kemalist	
Republic	whose	foundations	were	expressed	in	the	‘six	arrows’	of	
Kemalism.28	 ‘Improving’	the	Republic	per	se	is	nothing	new	–	the	
belief	 shared	by	Muslim	 elites	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 thoroughly	
revise	Turkish	identity	(one	manifestation	of	which	has	been	the	
increasing	popularity	and	presence	in	public	discourse	of	the	ide-
ology	known	as	‘Neo-Ottomanism’29)	has	been	the	driving	force	of	
the	changes	taking	place	since	2002.	However,	post-coup	Turkey,	
as	regards	its	ideology	and	identity	is	being	born	above	all	through	
mediation	between	the	elites	and	the	public.	In	turn,	the	public	op-
erates	with	a	specific	mixture	of	categories	created	by	the	‘old’	re-
public	and	those	characteristic	of	the	present	elites.	A	broad	range	
28	 These	were	‘republicanism’	(cumhuriyetçilik),	‘populism’	(halkçılık),	‘national-
ism’	(milliyetçilik),	‘secularism’	(laiklik),	‘statism’	(devletçilik)	and	‘reformism’	
(inkılapçılık/devrimcilik).	For	more	information	see:	A.	Szymański,	Między	
islamem	a	kemalizmem.	Problem	demokracji	w	Turcji,	Polski	Instytut	Spraw	
Międzynarodowych,	Warsaw	2008,	pp.	56-72.
29	 ‘Neo-Ottomanism’	is	usually	understood	through	the	prism	of	the	political	
concept	elaborated	by	the	former	minister	of	foreign	affairs	and	prime	minis-
ter,	Ahmet	Davutoğlu,	being	an	ideological	basis	for	the	Turkish	political,	cul-
tural	and	economic	expansion	in	the	countries	which	were	historically	linked	
to	the	Ottoman	Empire.	As	regards	Turkish	identity,	this	category	originates	
from	the	protest	traditions	of	Turkish	Islam	dating	back	to	the	1960s.	Cf.	H.	Ya-
vuz,	Social	and	Intellectual	Origins	of	Neo-Ottomanism:	Searching	for	a	Post-
National	Vision,	Die Welt des Islams, No.	53	(2016),	pp.	438-465.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
0/
20
17
29
of	motives	and	living	ideas	that	will	form	the	basic	content	of	the	
New	Turkey	have	occurred	 in	Turkish	political	 life	over	 the	past	
year.	Four	of	these,	which	can	be	recognised	as	the	main	pillars	of	
the	New	Turkey,	will	be	analysed	in	this	paper.	A	separate	place	is	
reserved	for	Islam,	which	in	this	context	functions	not	so	much	as	
one	of	the	‘pillars’	of	the	present	Turkish	identity	but	rather	as	the	
main	binding	factor	of	the	diversified	Turkish	national	community.	
1. The first pillar: the Nation
Since	the	beginning	of	its	rule,	the	AKP	has	demonstrated	an	am-
bivalent	 attitude	 towards	 the	Turkish	nation	 in	 its	Kemalist	 in-
terpretation.	The	 coup	 has	made	 it	 possible	 for	 the	 government	
in	a	way	to	seal	the	process	of	‘regaining’	the	nation	and	to	weave	
this	idea	into	its	own	identity	project.	The	process	of	combining	the	
previously	existing	national	idea	with	the	creation	of	New	Turkey	
has,	however,	been	conducted	in	a	very	inconsistent	manner.	The	
AKP	treats	the	Turkish	nation	as	a	holistic	idea.	This	makes	it	pos-
sible	to	draw	upon	both	those	elements	that	have	been	inherited	
from	the	Kemalist	Republic	and	the	inclusive	project	the	present	
Turkish	elites	were	promoting	in	certain	periods	of	their	rule.	
The	traditions	of	the	Turkish	national	idea	date	back	to	the	late	19th	
century.	 Since	 that	 time,	 nationalism	 in	 Turkey	 has	 undergone	
a	 dynamic	 transformation.	 However,	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 Turk-
ish	nation	as	a	political	community	of	all	citizens	of	the	Republic	of	
Turkey	and	those	who	speak	Turkish	has	been	entrenched	since	the	
beginning	of	the	existence	of	the	Kemalist	Republic.	The	commu-
nity	is	strongly	linked	to	the	state,	which	suggests	that	the	Turk-
ish	model	of	nationalism	has	a	political	(civic)	character.	However,	
in	practice,	the	community	has	been	defined	through	the	prism	of	
ethnic	identity	(as	part	of	which	minorities	should	become	assimi-
lated),	and	most	of	its	members	are	Sunni	Muslims.30
30	 Traditionally,	 ‘secularised’	 Islam,	understood	as	cultural	and	traditional	
membership	of	the	Sunni	community	controlled	by	the	state,	has	been	the	
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For	over	a	decade	of	its	rule,	the	AKP	has	opposed	ethnic	nation-
alism,	viewing	it	as	a	category	that	excludes	non-Turkish	Muslim	
minorities.31	At	the	same	time,	it	has	been	promoting	the	broader	
model	of	a	political	community	in	which	citizenship	and	religion	
are	the	main	categories	that	bring	together	the	diversified	Turk-
ish	public.	This	also	gave	rise	to	the	project	of	replacing	the	word	
Türk	(Turk)	in	public	discourse	with	the	word	Türkiyeli	(resident	
of	 Turkey).	 However,	 at	 least	 since	 2015,	 the	 government	 has	
been	propagating	a	model	in	which	ethnic	Turkish	nationalism	
is	treated	as	an	effective	tool	of	social	mobilisation.	This	is	a	re-
sult	of	both	temporary	political	conditions32	and	the	internalisa-
tion	of	nationalist	views	by	a	majority	of	 the	public,	as	well	as	
traditional	sentiments	inside	political	Islam	circles	from	which	
the	AKP	hails.33
Since	 the	 coup,	 the	AKP	has	been	weaving	 in	and	out	of	 ethnic	
nationalism	 and	 its	 own	 version	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 national	
community.	 For	 example,	 Prime	 Minister	 Binali	 Yıldırım,	 to	
show	 respect	 to	 the	Nationalist	Movement	Party	 (MHP),	which	
had	helped	the	AKP	garner	the	sufficient	number	of	votes	needed	
binding	factor	of	the	national	community	in	the	Republic	of	Turkey.	Turks,	
in	the	common	understanding,	are	above	all	Sunnis	speaking	Turkish,	then	
Sunni	ethnic	minorities,	then	non-Sunni	Turks,	while	only	recognised	na-
tional	minorities,	i.e.	Christian	Greeks	and	Armenians,	and	Jews,	have	been	
pushed	outside	the	margin	of	the	national	community.	S.	Cagaptay,	op. cit.
31	 For	 example,	 as	 recently	 as	 in	 2013,	 Erdoğan	 in	 his	 numerous	 speeches	
claimed	that	 the	AKP	was	a	grouping	that	“kept	nationalisms	under	 the	
thumb’	and	serves	all	the	residents	of	Turkey	who	formed	one	nation,	re-
gardless	of	their	ethnic	background.	S.	Şenyüz,	Erdoğan:	Milliyetçilik	ayak	
altında,	Hürriyet,	18	February	2013,	http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-
milliyetcilik-ayak-altinda-22621388
32	 The	Kurdish	conflict	that	was	rekindled	in	2015,	the	gradual	takeover	of	the	
nationalist	ideological	offer	by	the	AKP	and	subsequent	co-operation	with	
nationalists	in	the	work	on	constitutional	reform.	
33	 For	example,	Tanıl	Bora,	who	studies	the	Turkish	political	right,	claims	that	
political	Islam	in	Turkey	is	traditionally	combined	with	nationalism.	The	
Muslim	community	(ummah)	is	important	provided	that	Turks	as	heirs	of	the	
Ottoman	Empire	are	in	its	centre.	T.	Bora,	Türk	Sağının	Üç	Hâli.	Milliyetçi-
lik,	Muhafazakârlık,	İslâmcılık,	İletişim	Yayınları,	İstanbul	2014,	pp.	97-147.
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for	 the	 constitutional	 referendum,	 called	 Turkish	 nationalists	
‘brothers’	and	made	the	 ‘wolf ’	gesture,	which	is	used	by	radical	
nationalists	and	 is	associated	with	 the	Neo-Fascist	organisation	
Grey	Wolves	(Bozkurtlar).34
However,	the	present	government	over	the	past	year	has	made	
a	number	of	efforts	aimed	at	winning	the	support	of	minorities.	
The	poor	results	of	these	efforts	show	how	difficult	it	is	to	build	
an	 inclusive	 model	 of	 the	 nation.	 One	 clear	 example	 of	 these	
limitations	 is	 the	 policy	 towards	 Alevis,	 the	 country’s	 largest	
religious	minority	(15–30%).	Traditionally,	Alevis,	whose	rituals	
and	beliefs	originate	from	Shia	Islam,	traditional	Anatolian	mys-
ticism	and	elements	derived	 from	other	non-Islamic	 religions,	
suffered	 from	 severe	 repressions	 in	 both	 the	Ottoman	Empire	
and	the	republic.	They	also	fell	victim	to	massacres	committed	
by	the	Grey	Wolves	and	Islamists	who	accused	them	of	support-
ing	Communists.	Erdoğan	and	Yıldırım	in	their	speeches	called	
them	‘brothers’,	saying	that	the	traditional	Sunni-Alevi	antago-
nism	was	a	harmful	religious	schism	(fitne).35	Apparently,	these	
efforts	were	aimed	above	all	at	attempting	to	convince	Alevis	to	
support	 the	 presidential	 system.	However,	 no	 proposal	 for	 in-
cluding	this	minority	in	the	framework	of	the	newly	defined	na-
tional	community	has	been	presented,	and	Sunni	Islam	remains	
its	essential	element.	
As	regards	the	Kurdish	issue,	it	can	be	stated	with	high	probabil-
ity	 that	 there	 is	no	return	 to	 the	openness	policy	of	2009–2013.	
Yıldırım	himself	was	the	most	active	during	the	campaign	ahead	
of	the	referendum	in	the	areas	inhabited	predominantly	by	Kurds.	
34	 Yıldırım	makes	'Grey	wolves'	symbol	in	Turkish	parliament,	Sigma,	22	Feb-
ruary	 2017,	 http://www.sigmalive.com/en/news/international/152479/
yildirim-makes-grey-wolves-symbol-in-turkish-parliament#.dpuf	
35	 Cf.	Yıldırım:	Alevi	kültürüyle	iç	içe	büyüdüm,	BirGün,	21	March	2017,	http://
www.birgun.net/haber-detay/yildirim-alevi-kulturuyle-ic-ice-buyu-
dum-151888.html	
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He	 was	 promoting	 the	 supra-ethnic	 community	 model	 there.36	
These	efforts	had	very	limited	effects.	Most	Kurds	voted	against	
amending	the	constitution,37	and	thus	also	against	the	New	Tur-
key	concept.	This	means	that	country’s	largest	ethnic	minority	no	
longer	believes	in	the	slogans	of	Turkish-Kurdish	unity.
The	issue	of	granting	citizenship	to	some	of	the	Syrian	refugees	
living	in	Turkey	comes	as	a	kind	of	test	to	the	AKP’s	attempts	to	
redefine	the	Turkish	nation	as	discussed	in	this	text.	It	was	raised	
for	the	first	time	at	the	beginning	of	July	2016	and	almost	immedi-
ately	met	with	strong	resistance	from	a	section	of	society.38	How-
ever,	the	issue	was	resumed	at	the	beginning	of	2017,	but	this	time	
when	Erdoğan	spoke	about	the	naturalisation	of	Syrians,	he	tried	
to	make	it	part	of	‘patriotic	imagery’.	He	claimed	that	very	well-
adapted	individuals,	such	as	engineers	and	doctors,	were	among	
the	refugees	and	that	they	should	“work	as	sons	of	this	nation”.39	
Since	various	versions	of	the	interpretation	of	the	national	com-
munity	exist	among	the	Turkish	public,	the	official	canon	being	
created	by	the	government	is	intended	to	be	of	a	holistic	nature,	
36	 Both	the	prime	minister’s	friendly	gestures	towards	the	nationalists	and	
his	engagement	in	the	campaign	in	the	areas	inhabited	by	ethnic	Kurds	in	
Turkey	are	signs	of	the	high	degree	of	ambiguity	of	the	AKP’s	policy.	This	is	
linked	to	the	implications	that	the	prime	minister	has	Kurdish	roots	although	
he	has	never	admitted	this	since	taking	office.	
37	 Cf.	the	results	of	the	referendum	on	amending	the	constitution	in	the	prov-
inces	of	south-eastern	Turkey,	where	Kurds	form	the	majority	(Diyarbakır,	
Mardin,	Batman,	Siirt,	Şırnak,	Hakkari,	Van,	Ağrı,	 İğdır,	Ağrı,	Tunceli),	
http://secim.hurriyet.com.tr/referandum-sonuclari-2017	
38	 This	provoked,	amongst	other	things,	an	anti-Syrian	campaign	on	social	me-
dia.	However,	from	the	government’s	point	of	view	were	the	riots	that	took	
place	in	the	conservative	city	of	Konya	were	the	most	painful.	Konya	is	the	
cradle	and	the	model	centre	of	New	Turkey.	As	a	consequence	of	the	riots	
there,	two	people	were	killed.	Semih	Idiz,	Erdogan’s	citizenship	offer	fans	
flames	of	anti-Syrian	sentiment	in	Turkey,	Al-Monitor,	12	July	2016,	http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-syria-refugees-anti-
syrian-sentiments-on-rise.html#ixzz4jDzN8UbX	
39	 Cumhurbaşkanı	Erdoğan'dan	'vatandaşlık'	açıklaması,	Hürriyet,	6	January	
2017,	http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-vatandas-
lik-aciklamasi-40328957	
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highlighting	 the	elements	 that	allude	 to	 Islam.	 In	 the	discourse	
promoted	by	the	AKP,	the	category	of	‘sacred	nation’	(aziz millet),	
which	had	appeared	 in	 statements	of	AKP	politicians	 even	ear-
lier,	has	been	 further	 strengthened.	The	community	has	 its	he-
roes	(gaziler)	and	martyrs	(şehitler).40	In	this	context,	the	Turkish	
nation	is	understood	as	a	compact	community	of	the	residents	of	
Turkey.	It	is	especially	in	Erdoğan’s	speeches	that	the	definition	of	
the	nation	as	a	community	of	all	the	residents	of	Turkey,	without	
dividing	them	into	separate	ethnic	groups,	is	highlighted.	Thus	on	
the	one	hand	this	can	be	interpreted	as	a	return	to	the	model	that	
applied	in	the	first	decade	of	AKP	rule.	On	the	other	hand,	mani-
festing	an	identity	other	than	Turkish	and	competitive	to	it	is	still	
treated	as	violation	of	the	principle	of	unity	and	indivisibility	of	
the	nation	(this	concerns	above	all	Kurds).	
The	views	shared	by	a	significant	section	of	the	Turkish	public	is	
the	 strongest	 proof	 of	 the	difficulties	 the	AKP’s	 initiatives	have	
encountered.	One	example	of	the	incessant	conflict	between	the	
inclusive	and	the	pro-Islamic	projects	of	the	community	is	the	in-
cident	that	took	place	in	late	June	2017	in	Düzce	in	western	Tur-
key.	A	Rabia monument	was	erected	on	the	initiative	of	the	mayor,	
a	member	of	the	AKP.	He	presented	this	as	a	symbol	of	the	unity	
of	the	Turkish	nation	and	the	ideological	unity	that	had	allegedly	
emerged	after	15	July.	Since	the	symbol	has	been	constantly	used	
by	the	president	and	the	prime	minister	 in	their	public	appear-
ances,	and	thus	its	Turkish	interpretation	has	become	entrenched,	
there	 are	 plans	 to	 build	more	 of	 these	monuments.41	 However,	
this	initiative	met	with	opposition	from	members	of	the	Idealist	
Hearths	 (Ülkü Ocakları),	 the	youth	organisation	of	 the	National-
ist	Movement	 Party,	who	 covered	 the	monument	with	 the	 blue	
40	 These	motifs	appear	on	many	occasions,	for	example,	in	the	campaign	songs	
where	the	vote	for	introducing	the	presidential	system	in	the	referendum	
was	equated	to	a	kind	of	tribute	to	the	heroes	and	martyrs.	See:	https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Vac_IkE3HxQ	
41	 Düzce'ye	'rabia'	heykeli	dikildi,	BirGün,	21	June	2017,	http://www.birgun.net/
haber-detay/duzce-ye-rabia-heykeli-dikildi-165927.html	
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pan-Turkic	flag	with	a	wolf ’s	head.	The	organisers	of	the	protest	
argued	that	Rabia, being	the	symbol	of	the	Muslim	Brotherhood,	
is	Arabic	and	thus	alien	to	the	Turkish	culture.	At	the	same	time,	
they	emphasised	that	they	did	not	oppose	the	ideas	manifested	by	
it	but	they	insisted	on	adding	a	fifth	element,	namely	the	refer-
ence	to	the	one	language.42
The	existing	national	identity	is	thus	transforming	through	con-
stant	mediation	between	the	majority	of	the	Turkish	public	(who	
stick	 to	 nationalist	 sentiments)	 and	 the	 government’s	 project	
treating	the	nation	as	a	combination	of	political	and	ethnic	iden-
tity	in	which	Islam	is	an	essential	element.43
The	 principle	 of	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 nation,	 which	 was	 an	
achievement	of	the	Kemalist	Republic,	plays	a	key	role	in	the	dia-
logue	between	 the	government	and	 the	public.	The	mass	 rallies	
of	national	unity	convened	immediately	after	the	attempted	coup	
were	held	under	the	slogan	‘Sovereignty	unconditionally	belongs	
to	 the	 nation!’	 (Hakimiyet kayıtsız şartsız Milletindir!).	The	 same	
slogan,	which	is	present	in	the	buildings	of	parliament	and	in	the	
Atatürk	mausoleum	in	Ankara,	constantly	re-emerges	during	the	
public	speeches	of	the	president	and	other	politicians.	
42	 Ülkücüler,	 Düzce'ye	 dikilen	 Rabia	 heykelini	 bastı,	BirGün,	 22	June	 2017,	
http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/ulkuculer-duzce-ye-dikilen-rabia-
heykelini-basti-166061.html	
43	 For	example,	Fatih	Yaşlı,	a	pro-opposition	political	analyst,	claims	that	the	cat-
egory	of	the	Turkish	nation	is	currently	being	gradually	Islamised.	The	Turkish	
word	millet, even	though	it	had	been	used	for	more	than	one	hundred	years	by	
Turkish	nationalists	and,	above	all,	Kemalists,	has	been	easily	taken	over	by	
the	forces	linked	to	political	Islam,	since	originally,	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	
it	meant	above	all	a	community	of	the	faithful.	Therefore,	it	can	be	reconciled	
with	political	Islam,	which	cannot	be	said	about	the	Turkish	neologism	ulus 
introduced	by	Kemalists.	C.	Semercioğlu,	Akademisyen	Fatih	Yaşlı:	Şeriat	
anayasada	yazmayacak	ama	fiilen	uygulanacak,	Diken,	28	October	2016,	http://
www.diken.com.tr/akademisyen-fatih-yasli-seriat-anayasada-yazmayacak-
ama-fiilen-uygulanacak/	
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The	idea	of	the	nation	is	thus	a	key	element	of	the	New	Turkey,	where	
the	government	owes	it	power	to	having	been	elected	by	a	majority	
of	the	citizens	and,	according	to	official	discourse,	its	role	is	to	serve	
the	people.	The	nation	is	the	source	of	the	government’s	legitimacy	
because	 it	 has	massive	 support.	 Taking	 over	 the	 strictly	modern	
concept,	as	the	principle	of	sovereignty	of	the	nation	is,	guarantees	
the	continuity	of	the	system	to	the	government	and	also	adds	cred-
ibility	to	the	project	being	implemented.	It	 is	 intended	that	 it	will	
maintain	 its	 republican	 character,	 however,	 with	 the	 difference	
that	in	the	official	narrative,	the	AKP	is	the	first	power	in	Turkey’s	
history	to	fully	implement	the	principle	of	sovereignty.	
2. The second pillar: the State
The	state	is	the	overriding	value	in	post-coup	Turkey.	Its	citizens	
defended	it	from	conspirators.	Thus	the	idea	of	the	state’s	primacy	
is	inherent	in	the	coup	myth.	The	New	Turkey	is	intended	to	be,	
above	 all,	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 ages	 of	 statehood	 tradition	 and	
its	 crowning	 achievement.	 In	 its	new	 form,	 it	 is	 expected	 to	 be	
a	strong	and	sovereign	state,	and	to	both	guarantee	welfare	to	all	
its	citizens	and	carry	out	tasks	that	reach	far	beyond	its	borders.	
On	the	one	hand	this	means	a	continuation	of	 the	tradition	 ini-
tiated	already	in	the	Kemalist	Republic,	however,	supplemented	
with	elements	that	are	clearly	at	odds	with	it.	These	include,	above	
all,	opening	up	to	the	external	world	(giving	up	the	self-sufficien-
cy	and	isolationism	of	the	old	republic)	and	drawing	upon	Islam.	
Thus	the	AKP	is	collecting	the	ideas	inherited	from	Kemalist	Tur-
key,	adding	a	new	dimension	to	them,	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	
the	state	being	built	by	the	present	government	and	its	citizens	
had	to	fight	a	decisive	battle	with	its	enemy.	The	survival	of	the	
project	depended	on	its	outcome.	
The	state	 is	 strongly	 sacralised	 in	 the	Turkish	republican	 tradi-
tion.	This	was	already	visible	in	the	first	decades	of	the	republic’s	
existence,	when	it	was	being	proven	that	Turks	had	set	up	states	
in	 all	 the	 lands	 they	 had	 arrived	 throughout	 their	 history	 long	
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before	the	Ottoman	Empire	was	built.	According	to	some	myths	
which	have	the	status	of	‘scientific	facts’,	they	have	built	over	one	
hundred	states	throughout	history.44	In	this	context,	the	Turkish	
state	is	a	carrier	of	a	highly	developed	civilisation,	order,	organi-
sation	and	lawfulness.	In	the	Kemalist	version,	the	main	function	
of	 this	mythologisation	 of	 the	 state	was	 to	 lower	 the	 historical	
rank	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	to	create	a	secular,	nationalist	
narrative	as	an	opposition	to	overarching	Islamic	ideals.	The	cir-
cles	originating	from	political	 Islam	and	thus	opposing	discred-
iting	the	Ottoman	Empire	have,	however,	taken	over	part	of	the	
ideas	where	the	Turkish	statehood	has	a	longer	history	than	Islam	
itself.
In	the	narrative	elaborated	by	the	AKP,	the	mythology	created	in	
the	republic	is	in	a	way	re-Islamised.	The	present	government	on	
the	one	hand	draws	on	the	achievements	of	the	aforementioned	
‘Turkish-Islamic	synthesis’	as	part	of	which	Turkish	history	is	de-
veloping	along	two	tracks.	References	are	made	to	historic	Turkic	
countries,	some	of	which	existed	before	the	ancestors	of	modern	
Turks	accepted	Islam	as	their	religion.45	On	the	other	hand,	it	 is	
believed	that	Islam	is	an	inseparable	element	of	Turkish	culture.46	
Islam	 is	 also	 inextricably	 linked	 to	Turkey’s	history	and,	 in	 the	
context	of	the	present	elite’s	interpretation	of	the	state,	it	provides	
another	argument	for	the	idea	of	a	strong	state	which	is	perceived	
as	an	entity	of	a	sacral	nature	which	needs	to	be	worshipped.47
44	 T.	Bora,	Milli	Tarih	ve	Devlet	Mitosu, [in:]	Idem,	Medeniyet	Kaybı:	Milliyetçi-
lik	ve	Faşizm	üzerine	Yazılar, İletişim	Yayınları,	Istanbul	2006,	pp.	43-65.
45	 Cf.	Erdoğan	receiving	foreign	guests	in	the	Presidential	Palace	(Ak Saray)	
in	the	company	of	16	warriors	representing	16	historic	Turkish	empires,	in-
cluding	Huns,	Blue	Turks	and	others.	See:	Karşılama	sırasındaki	16	asker	
ne	anlama	geliyor?,	Yeni Akit,	12	January	2015,	http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/
haber/karsilama-sirasindaki-16-asker-ne-anlama-geliyor-46473.html	
46	 J.	White,	Muslim	Nationalism	and	 the	New	Turks,	Princeton	University	
Press,	Princeton	and	New	York	2014.
47	 The	author’s	conversation	with	an	AKP	activist,	Ankara,	28	April	2015.
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In	 the	present	discourse,	Turkey	has	a	mission	 that	reaches	be-
yond	its	borders.	Despite	the	objective	conditions	which	seriously	
restricted	the	implementation	of	the	neo-Ottoman	project	(above	
all	the	fall	of	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	in	Egypt	and	the	continuing	
military	conflicts	in	Syria	and	Iraq),	the	Turkish	government,	at	
least	on	the	level	of	declarations,	has	not	given	up	its	ambitions	of	
building	a	state	that	will	be	the	leader	of	the	Muslim	world.	One	
proof	of	these	ambitions	is	a	political	broadcast	shown	during	the	
campaign	 preceding	 the	 referendum	 entitled	 ‘Turkey	 is	 larger	
than	Turkey’.48	The	scenes	of	this	spot	are	located	subsequently	in	
the	Arab	countries	of	the	Middle	East,	Pakistan,	Kazakhstan,	Bos-
nia,	France,	Saudi	Arabia	and	Turkey,	and	the	final	scene	shows	
children	reconstructing	the	defence	of	Anatolia	during	the	War	of	
Independence	(1920–1922).	In	this	way	the	image	of	Turkey	is	pre-
sented	as	a	state	that	protects	the	Arab	and	Sunni	residents	of	the	
Middle	East,	a	partner,	a	model	and	a	patron	for	the	world’s	larg-
est	Muslim	countries	 (such	as	Pakistan).	Furthermore,	 the	film	
presents	Turkey	as	the	strongest	Turkic	state	and	a	power	which	
has	made	 an	 essential	 contribution	 to	 the	 history	 of	 humanity	
(a	Turkish	 taxi	driver	 in	Paris	has	 to	explain	 this	 to	his	French	
customer	who	wrongfully	disregards	this	contribution).	In	each	
of	the	countries	presented	in	the	broadcast,	Turkey	is	treated	with	
esteem	or	gratitude.	 It	 is	a	mixture	of	neo-Ottoman	(Arab	Mid-
dle	East	and	Bosnia),	pan-Islamic	(Pakistan49)	and	also	pan-Turkic	
motifs.	All	these	are	fastened	with	the	clip	of	hollow	references	to	
history	that	are	intended	to	manifest	the	greatness	and	heroism	
of	Turks	and	to	legitimise	Turkey’s	presence	in	Europe	(the	Turk-
ish	diaspora	in	Europe	as	an	effective	political	instrument).
48	 Türkiye Türkiye’den büyüktür,	 http://www.ahaber.com.tr/webtv/yasam/
turkiye-turkiyeden-buyuktur	
49	 Notwithstanding	the	present	friendly	relations	existing	between	Turkey	
and	Pakistan,	it	should	be	kept	in	mind	that	Muslims	from	India	were	among	
those	who	especially	strongly	insisted	that	Mustafa	Kemal	should	give	up	the	
idea	of	liquidating	the	caliphate.	Conservative	and	religious	circles	in	Turkey	
still	remember	this.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
0/
20
17
38
The	idea	of	the	state	in	the	New	Turkish	version	is	thus	a	combi-
nation	of	moves	proposed	by	the	AKP,	such	as	giving	up	Kemalist	
self-reliance	 and	 isolationism,	 and	 replacing	 them	with	 expan-
sionism,	as	well	as	a	whole	array	of	ideas	that	were	born	in	Turkey	
in	the	late	19th	century	(echoes	of	pan-Islamism)	and	the	first	half	
of	 the	20th	 century	 (such	as	 references	 to	 the	War	of	 Independ-
ence	and	pan-Turkism)	and,	finally,	 anti-Westernism	shared	by	
Kemalist	 and	 Islamic	 circles	 that	 have	 been	 reinterpreted	 and	
presented	in	a	vivid	and	modern	form.	
While	all	the	ideas	presented	above,	when	taken	separately,	have	
competed	with	each	other	throughout	the	history	of	the	Republic	
of	Turkey,	now	they	are	being	combined	in	the	New	Turkey,	and	
this	is	expected	to	form	a	renewed	identity	of	the	Turkish	state.	
The	idea	of	the	renewal	of	the	state	and	the	implementation	of	its	
mission	are	the	overriding	goals.	It	is	the	state	that	is	supposed	to	
express	the	will	of	the	nation,	to	protect	it	from	its	enemies’	in-
trigues	and	to	claim	Muslims’	rights	worldwide.	Thus	it	is	a	state	
that	is	just	as	serious	and	majestic	as	the	early	republic.	
3. The third pillar: the Leader
The	figure	of	the	 leader	is	closely	 linked	to	the	idea	of	the	state.	
The	idea	of	a	strong	leadership	is	deeply	entrenched	in	the	Turk-
ish	culture.	Increasing	affirmation	and	the	elevation	of	the	figure	
of	Erdoğan	has	been	observed	 in	post-coup	Turkey;	 this	 is	done	
partly	 through	references	 to	Atatürk	 interwoven	with	 ideologi-
cal	elements	of	the	New	Turkey,	of	which	Erdoğan	is	an	architect.	
This	image	of	the	president	has	been	strengthened	by	the	15	July	
myth.	It	was	he	who	led	the	nation	to	victory	in	the	struggle	with	
the	conspirators;	and	it	is	under	his	rule	that	Turkey	is	expected	
to	become	a	powerful	state	again.	The	leader’s	heroism	at	the	time	
of	the	coup	and	his	unity	with	the	nation	which	was	manifested	
during	 the	decisive	confrontation	additionally	strengthened	his	
legitimacy.	The	president	 is	 the	 central	figure	 of	 the	 order	 cur-
rently	being	constructed.	The	constitutional	reform	passed	in	the	
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April	 referendum	 envisages	 vesting	 the	 president	 with	 execu-
tive	power	and	in	fact	with	control	of	the	judiciary.50	Along	with	
a	 thorough	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 political	 system	which	means	
replacing	 the	 parliamentary-cabinet	 model	 with	 a	 presidential	
one,	 the	 formal	strengthening	of	Erdoğan’s	position	 in	 the	state	
is	 a	 solution	of	great	 symbolic	 significance.	The	president	 is	 ex-
pected	to	be	the	face	and	the	strongest	emanation	of	the	state	in	
the	New	Turkey.	He	is	commonly	viewed	as	a	guarantor	of	stabil-
ity,	citizens’	welfare	and	Turkey’s	strength.	Like	the	state	itself,	
the	leader	is	also	an	object	of	a	cult	in	Turkey.	
The	president’s	strong	position,	which	is	becoming	formally	and	
symbolically	entrenched,	is	both	an	effect	of	Erdoğan’s	personal	
characteristics	(such	as	political	instinct,	the	consistent	building	
of	his	position	in	the	party	and	the	resulting	indisputable	esteem)	
and	of	much	deeper	cultural	factors.51
At	 present,	 the	 Turkish	 leader’s	 cult	 is	 both	 consciously	 being	
built	by	himself	and	as	a	result	of	the	grassroots	initiatives	of	his	
supporters.	As	 regards	Erdoğan’s	own	conscious	building	of	his	
position,	the	intentional	references	to	Atatürk	are	the	first	thing	
that	need	to	be	noticed.	The	incumbent	president’s	attitude	to	the	
founder	of	 the	republic,	at	 least	on	 the	 level	of	declarations,	 re-
mains	ambivalent.	Like	the	traditional	books	of	Islam	in	Turkey,	
Erdoğan	worships	Mustafa	Kemal52	as	a	commander	of	the	Otto-
50	 K.	Strachota,	The	constitutional	referendum	–	another	step	towards	a	New	
Turkey,	OSW Commentary,	28	April	2017,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-commentary/2017-04-28/constitutional-referendum-another-
step-towards-a-new-turkey	
51	 These	 factors	 include	above	all	 the	patriarchal	model	of	Turkish	culture	
where	the	head	of	the	family	has	a	strong	position.	Respect	and	indisput-
able	obedience	are	owed	to	him.	This	model	is	transferred	to	the	level	of	the	
public	vision	of	the	state,	which	is	manifested	in	the	cult	of	leaders.	M.	Evin,	
D.	Kandiyoti,	Ataerkillik	artık	bir	yönetim	biçimi,	Milliyet,	19	October	2013,	
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ataerkillik-artik-bir-yonetim/gundem/de-
tay/1778732/default.htm	
52	 It	has	been	noticed	in	Turkish	public	opinion	for	a	long	time	that	Erdoğan,	
when	speaking	about	the	founder	of	the	republic,	avoids	saying	his	surname	
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man	 army	who	waged	 holy	war	 against	 the	Western	 Christian	
occupiers.	He	has	also	made	a	whole	array	of	references	 to	spe-
cific	events	in	Kemal’s	biography	which	were	linked	to	the	crucial	
moments	 in	 the	history	of	 the	Republic	of	Turkey.	One	example	
may	be	the	 fact	 that	he	visited	Samsun	and	Erzurum	at	 the	be-
ginning	 of	 the	 referendum	 campaign,	which	was	 an	 open	 allu-
sion	to	Kemal’s	actions	organising	the	resistance	movement	right	
before	the	War	of	Independence.53	This	is	expected	to	mean	that	
Erdoğan’s	policy	has	the	character	of	a	thorough	reconstruction	of	
the	Turkish	state	and	society	on	a	scale	comparable	to	the	reforms	
conducted	in	the	first	years	of	the	republic’s	existence.	Erdoğan	is	
expected	to	become	a	‘new	Atatürk’,	being	the	main	builder	of	the	
renewed	state.	The	cult	of	the	founding	father	is	gradually	being	
replaced	with	 the	cult	of	 the	present	president,	 the	most	recent	
manifestation	of	which	was	the	premiere	of	the	biographical	film	
Reis (‘Chief ’)	that	took	place	on	3	March	2017,	on	the	ninety-third	
anniversary	of	the	abolition	of	the	caliphate	by	Kemal.54
As	 regards	 the	 grassroots	 initiatives,	 the	 developing	 cult	 of	
Erdoğan	has	been	expressed	 in	panegyric	songs	and	video	clips	
which	are	created	as	a	tribute	to	him.	Erdoğan	is	extolled	in	them	
as	a	 long-awaited	leader	who	has	become	the	voice	of	the	previ-
ously	suppressed	religious	masses	and	a	defender	of	the	Turkish	
state.	 In	such	works	he	is	depicted	as	 ‘the	one	who	explains	the	
Word	 of	 the	Truth’	 (Söz-ü Hakkı anlatan),	 ‘the	nightmare	 of	 the	
treacherous	brutes’	(hayin zalimlerin korkulu rüyasi)	or	‘the	lion	of	
Ummah)	(Ümmetin arslani).55	The	cult	expressed	via	such	works	is	
and	would	rather	call	him	‘Gazi	Mustafa	Kemal’.	The	main	meaning	of	the	
title	‘gazi’	means	defender	of	the	faith.	
53	 A.	O.	Осипян,	Смена	идеологии	в	Турции:	культ	Ататюрка	уступает	
места	культу	Эрдогана,	Институт	Ближнего	Востока,	28	February	2017,	
http://www.iimes.ru/?p=32823	
54	  Ibid.
55	 Cf.	the	song	Yeni Erdoğan Marşi (The	new	march	to	Erdoğan)	by	A.	Sinanoğlu,	
which	was	watched	over	1,900,000	times	on	YouTube	between	September	
2016	and	June	2017,	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FJdX51x_bY	
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based	on	attributing	to	him	the	features	typical	of	an	ideal	Mus-
lim	leader	and	the	use	of	phrases	that	are	traditionally	reserved	
to	describing	Atatürk,	such	as	‘the	Heroic	Commander-in-Chief ’	
(Kahraman Başkomutan).	
This	kind	of	cult	of	Erdoğan	in	Turkey	itself	is	treated	on	the	one	
hand	as	the	government	expropriating	the	models	of	the	old	Tur-
key	which	 the	AKP	used	 to	 combat	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 its	 rule	
(above	all,	 the	cult	of	Atatürk	which	 took	absurd	and	para-reli-
gious	forms).56	However,	it	 is	believed	to	mean	something	more.	
According	 to	 the	 commentator	 Fatih	 Yaşlı,	 the	 present	 cult	 of	
Erdoğan,	 along	with	 the	 presidential	 system	 being	 introduced,	
are	an	attempt	to	turn	into	reality	the	utopian	vision	of	the	‘State	
of	 Sublime	Leadership’	 (Başyücelik Devleti)	 elaborated	 by	 the	 Is-
lamist	poet,	writer	and	 thinker	Necip	Fazıl	Kısakürek,57	who	 is	
popular	in	government	circles	and	one	of	the	most	uncompromis-
ing	critics	of	the	secular	system	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey.	As	part	
of	this	utopia,	the	Islamist	state	would	be	governed	by	an	‘Sublime	
Leader’	(Başyüce)	who	would	be	elected	not	in	a	general	election	
but	 by	 a	 special	 ‘Assembly	 of	 the	 Sublime’	 (Yüceler Kurultayı).58	
Only	some	of	the	members	of	the	assembly	would	be	elected,	and	
the	main	features	that	would	decide	on	membership	of	the	assem-
56	 The	opposition	views	this	cult	as	re-creating	‘the	only	man’s	regime’	(Tek 
Adam rejimi),	 this	being	a	reference	to	 the	popular	biography	of	Mustafa	
Kemal	written	by	Şevket	Süreyya	Aydemir	with	the	same	title	(Tek Adam).	
See:	M.	Akyol,	Coming	soon:	Erdogan	‘The	Chief ’,	Al-Monitor, 13	February	
2017,	http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/02/turkey-erdogan-
movie-boost-cult-personality.html	
57	 Necip	Fazıl	Kısakürek	 (1904–1983),	a	 thinker	 linked	 to	 the	Sufi	brother-
hood	Naqshbandiya.	His	views	were	a	combination	of	radical	Islam,	Turk-
ish	nationalism	(also	taking	racist	forms),	anti-Semitism	and	radical	criti-
cism	of	the	West,	communism	and	capitalism.	According	to	critics	of	the	
present	Turkish	government,	Necip	Fazıl’s	teachings	are	still	an	inspiration	
to	 the	most	conservative	circles	 inside	the	AKP.	See:	A.	Hür,	Necip	Fazıl	
Kısakürek'in	'öteki'	portresi,	Radikal,	6	January	2013,	http://www.radikal.
com.tr/yazarlar/ayse-hur/necip-fazil-kisakurekin-oteki-portresi-1115579/	
58	 F.	Yaşlı,	 Türk	 tipi	 başkanlık	mı	Başyücelik	Devleti	mi?,	BirGün Gazetesi,	
1	March	2017,	http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/turk-tipi-baskanlik-mi-
basyucelik-devleti-mi-148731.html	
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bly	would	be	piety	and	the	knowledge	of	Islam.	However,	this	pro-
ject	is	strongly	in	contrast	to	what	Erdoğan	currently	presents	as	
the	foundation	of	his	legitimacy,	i.e.	‘the	will	of	the	people’	(milli 
irade)	and	the	principle	of	the	sovereignty	of	the	nation.	Accord-
ing	to	the	utopia,	 the	 latter	of	the	principles	could	be	cancelled,	
being	an	innovation	imported	from	the	West,	and	replaced	with	
the	principle	of	‘sovereignty	which	belongs	to	the	Truth’	(Hakimi-
yet Hakkındır!)	taken	from	the	mystical	interpretation	of	Islam.	
4. The fourth pillar: the struggle for a better tomorrow
The	coup	myth	is	a	strong	sign	that	the	order	being	built	in	Turkey	
requires	an	incessant	struggle.	The	Turkish	public	is	mobilised	for	
this	struggle,	and	this	mobilisation	is	taking	place	as	a	result	of	
both	 the	discourse	 generated	by	 the	 government	 and	 the	 exist-
ence	of	hostile	forces	per	se.	The	New	Turkey	project	(inspired	by	
the	rehabilitated	Ottoman	past	without	rejecting	the	nationalist	
version	of	the	history	of	the	Turkish	nation	elaborated	in	the	re-
public)	in	principle	envisages	turning	to	the	future	where,	how-
ever,	various	dangers	are	lurking.	Therefore	struggle	is	inherent	
in	the	construction	process.
The	economic	success	 from	which	broad	swathes	of	 the	Turkish	
public	benefited	during	the	first	two	terms	of	the	AKP’s	rule	and	
the	unprecedented	civilisational	advancement	and	subjectivisa-
tion	of	these	masses	still	form	one	of	the	central	elements	of	the	
narrative	 generated	 by	 the	 government.59	One	motif	 constantly	
recurs	 in	 the	numerous	 speeches	 of	Erdoğan	 and	his	 aides:	 the	
AKP	government	is	meant	to	serve	the	public.	Thus	it	is	the	antith-
esis	of	all	previous	governments	–	above	all	Kemalists	who	repre-
sented	the	interests	of	the	old	elites	that	functioned	in	the	1990s	
59	 This	was	also	one	of	the	main	motifs	of	the	campaign	ahead	of	the	constitu-
tional	referendum.	Erdoğan	in	each	of	his	speeches	specified	the	number	
of	schools,	universities	and	hospitals	built	and	infrastructural	investments	
implemented	on	a	vast	scale	under	AKP	rule.	For	more	information	on	the	
civilisational	leap	under	the	AKP	see:	M.	Matusiak,	op. cit.,	pp.	27-31.
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and	implemented	the	narrow	interests	of	the	party,	thus	leading	
to	political	destabilisation	and	economic	crisis.	The	discourse	gen-
erated	by	the	government	and	its	popularity	will	not	change	even	
as	a	result	of	numerous	turbulences,	such	as	the	slowing	down	of	
the	Turkish	economy,	and	halting	and	clearly	regressing	the	de-
mocratisation	process.	
The	changes	introduced	over	the	past	fifteen	years	have	met	with	
strong	resistance	from	the	enemies	of	the	project.	The	main	ene-
mies	include	the	Gülen	Movement,	which	is	viewed	as	something	
like	a	sect	and	an	existential	threat	to	the	state,	followed	by	vari-
ous	terrorist	organisations,	such	as	the	Kurdistan	Workers’	Party	
(PKK)	and	its	splinter	groups	as	well	as	Islamic	State,	the	group-
ings	 responsible	 for	 the	wave	 of	 terror	 that	 has	 been	 sweeping	
across	Turkey	since	the	middle	of	2015.	Preventing	the	negative	
consequences	of	this	struggle	is	possible	solely	by	strengthening	
the	state.	The	terror	and	the	unsuccessful	attempt	to	overthrow	
the	government	are	the	price	that	had	to	be	paid	for	a	thorough	
reconstruction	of	the	state.	
The	appeal	 for	 the	struggle	 for	a	better	 future	 is	principally	ex-
pressed	in	two	forms,	which	could	be	observed	during	the	cam-
paign	 preceding	 the	 April	 referendum.	 The	 first	 one	 involves	
frequently	 comparing	 the	 opponents	 of	 the	 presidential	 system	
to	PKK,	Islamic	State	and	the	Gülen	Movement,	which	AKP	poli-
ticians	 were	 making	 almost	 all	 the	 time	 throughout	 the	 cam-
paign.60	Here,	the	price	of	building	the	New	Turkey	is	the	blood	of	
the	coup	victims,	the	soldiers	killed	in	the	south	east	of	the	coun-
try	and	those	who	have	died	in	terrorist	attacks.	All	of	these	are	
the	heroes	and	martyrs	of	 the	New	Turkey.	The	second	 form	 in	
which	this	struggle	is	manifested	is	positive	and	means	turning	
to	the	future.	This	was	best	expressed	in	one	of	the	political	broad-
60	 Cf.	Erdoğan:	Kandil'dekiler,	PKK,	FETÖ	'Hayır'	diyor	'Hayır'	diye	aldatılanlar	
ne	anlama	geliyor?,	Hürriyet,	23	March	2017,	https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/
erdogan-kandildekiler-pkk-feto-hayir-diyo-40404737
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casts	aired	during	the	campaign,	where	tribute	to	the	victims	was	
combined	with	the	promise	of	a	brighter	future.	The	New	Turkey	
honours	its	heroes	(Tüm Şehitler ve Gaziler için),	and	the	last	lines	
“for	a	brighter	future,	for	children,	for	our	tomorrow,	all	togeth-
er	for	a	Powerful	Turkey!”	(Aydınlık bir gelecek için, Çocuklar için, 
Yarınlarımız için, Hep birlikte Güçlü Türkiye!)	were	sung	by	Prime	
Minister	Binali	Yıldırım’s	granddaughter.61	Thus	one	of	 the	cen-
tral	places	in	the	new	discourse	is	reserved	for	a	positive	message	
highlighting	 the	 civilisational	 progress	 made	 under	 the	 AKP’s	
rule.	Its	continuation	may	only	be	guaranteed	by	sealing	a	renew-
al	of	the	Turkish	state.	
The	struggle	‘for	a	better	tomorrow’	can	be	seen	as	a	re-interpret-
ed	principle	of	the	revolutionary	reformism	that	was	introduced	
in	the	1930s.	According	to	this	principle,	the	new	order	being	cre-
ated	from	top-down	is	to	be	constantly	renewed	because	change	is	
the	essence	of	doing	politics.	In	this	context,	the	AKP	is	explicitly	
recognised	as	a	revolutionary	grouping	that	has	made	the	great-
est	changes	in	the	Turkish	state	since	the	establishment	of	the	re-
publican	system;	and	the	changes	have	to	be	continuous,	i.e.	they	
should	not	be	confined	to	achieving	temporary	goals.62	
61	 See:	http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/iste-ak-partinin-referandum-sark-
isi/haber-599759	
62	 Cf.	Erdoğan’s	speech	on	the	occasion	of	his	regaining	the	AKP	leadership.	
It	 includes	 statements	on	 the	 revolutionary	nature	of	 the	party	 and	 the	
continuing	construction	of	 the	new	order	which	 is	 to	begin	with	the	re-
newal	of	the	party	itself:	Cumhurbaşkanı	Erdoğan:	AK	Parti	devrimci	bir	
partidir,	Haber Turk,	 30	May	2017,	 http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/
haber/1513038-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ak-parti-devrimci-bir-partidir	
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IV. conclusIons And PossIble deVeloPmenTs
The	process	of	disassembling	 the	Kemalist	order	and	the	simul-
taneous	construction	of	 the	New	Turkey	has	been	underway	 in	
Turkey	for	fifteen	years.	Both	the	failed	coup	and	the	actions	tak-
en	as	a	consequence	of	it	are	irreversibly	changing	the	character	
of	the	Turkish	state.	These	moves	include	purges	in	the	state	ap-
paratus	and	the	success	of	the	constitutional	referendum	on	the	
grounds	of	which	a	strong	presidential	system	will	be	introduced.	
The	victory	over	putschists	 in	 this	context	 is	 the	most	essential	
turning	point	in	the	construction	of	the	new	order	and	forms	its	
ideological	 core.	The	 crystallised	 ideological	 canon	 will	 evolve,	
but	the	founding	myth	of	victory	over	enemies	and	the	defence	of	
the	state	constructed	anew	will	remain	unchanged.
As	a	result	of	the	processes	initiated	after	15	July	2016	more	than	
half	of	Turkish	citizens	have	become	strongly	consolidated	–	they	
are	supporters	of	the	government	who	guarantee	it	a	stable	ma-
jority.	They	 are	 the	beneficiaries	 and	 co-authors	 of	 the	 changes	
which	 have	 been	 taking	 place	 since	 2002.	They,	 the	 leader	 and	
the	state	are	one.	The	shared	experience	is	strong,	emotional	and	
generational.	This	allows	them	to	turn	to	the	future	and	continue	
building	the	new	order.	In	comparison	with	all	this,	the	AKP’s	op-
ponents	are	dispersed	and	focused	on	defending	themselves.	Since	
they	have	no	alternative	proposal,	the	perspective	of	a	democratic	
government	change	in	Turkey	is	at	present	very	distant,	if	this	is	
likely	at	all.	The	construction	of	the	new	order	is	far	from	over,	but	
the	AKP	and	its	supporters	have	reached	a	 landmark.	A	sudden	
breakdown	cannot	be	ruled	out	here.	However,	if	this	is	the	case,	
the	most	likely	scenario	would	be	a	powerful	mobilisation	of	the	
government’s	 supporters,	 and	 any	 attempt	 to	 impose	 a	political	
change	on	them	by	any	minority	would	bring	chaos	to	the	state.	
The	entrenchment	of	the	new	canon	of	ideas	above	all	means	that	
a	thorough	reinterpretation	of	the	state	and	national	identity	has	
taken	 place	 in	 Turkey.	The	 present	 identity	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	
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related	community	is	a	synthesis	of	the	key	motifs	of	the	Turkish	
political	imagination	that	have	previously	been	mutually	exclusive	
–	both	those	proposed	by	the	AKP	and	the	ones	that	existed	before	
it.	These	include	the	rehabilitation	of	the	Ottoman	period	and	merg-
ing	this	with	the	legacy	of	the	republic,	the	achievements	of	mod-
ernisation	and	anti-Westernism,	democratisation	and	authoritar-
ian	tendencies,	Islam	and	nationalism.	Turkey	is	becoming	a	point	
of	reference	for	itself.	Furthermore,	it	is	Turkey	that	is	expected	to	
become	the	source	of	civilisational	and	political	standards	for	other	
countries.	This	model	is	relatively	flexible	and	balanced.	The	Turk-
ish	nation	is	a	pillar	of	the	New	Turkey,	and	this	idea	has	not	been	
undermined	by	 the	 experiments	made	 so	 far.	Contemporary	na-
tionalism	is	no	longer	Kemalist	nationalism.	Nevertheless,	it	is	still	
difficult	to	recognise	it	as	inclusive	to	an	extent	that	would	allow	
the	minorities	to	be	made	part	of	it.	Islam	plays	an	important	role	as	
a	key	identity-building	element	and	an	inseparable	part	of	the	re-
newed	Turkey’s	landscape.	However,	at	present	it	cannot	be	said	by	
any	means	that	a	religious	state,	let	alone	a	form	of	theocracy,	is	be-
ing	formed	as,	for	example,	in	Iran.	In	turn,	the	fact	that	the	system	
strongly	relies	on	the	leader	does	not	mean	that	the	leader	does	not	
have	to	make	efforts	to	maintain	public	support	and	to	constantly	
renew	his	mandate.	Proof	of	the	latter	was	the	campaign	preceding	
the	constitutional	referendum	which	was	exhausting	for	Erdoğan.	
From	 the	AKP’s	point	of	view,	 conflicts	 are	 inherent	 in	govern-
ing	Turkey.	This	boosts	 the	mobilisation	of	 the	government	and	
the	 public,	 and	 intensifies	 political	 dynamics.	 For	 this	 reason,	
the	 political	 situation	 inside	 Turkey	will	 be	 developing	 around	
conflicts	for	a	long	time	still	–	both	within	the	government	camp	
(even	though	the	conflicts	are	not	disclosed	to	the	general	public,	
they	are	a	fact	and	cause	endless	renewals	and	reshuffles	in	the	
party)	and	against	the	Gülen	Movement,	PKK	and	Kemalist	and	
left-wing	circles.	
More	 than	 fifty	 years	 since	 it	 joined	NATO	 (and	 two	 centuries	
since	 the	 launch	of	 the	modernisation	processes),	Turkey	seems	
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finally	 to	be	distancing	 itself	 from	the	West,	which	 is	no	 longer	
a	point	of	reference	for	Turkey	in	the	areas	of	culture	and	politics.	
The	new	republic	is	replacing	liberal	democracy	with	a	sovereign	
democracy	 model.	 Democracy	 of	 the	 state	 is	 only	 plebiscitary.	
Anti-Westernism	is	explicitly	articulated	–	the	West’s	actions	are	
perceived	as	openly	hostile.	This	allows	the	public	to	be	consolidat-
ed	around	popular	slogans	(which	concerns	both	AKP	supporters	
and	Kemalists)	and	gives	fuel	for	strategic	moves	in	foreign	policy	
–	Turkey	intends	to	consistently	build	and	reinforce	its	position	as	
an	equal	partner	in	contacts	with	the	West	(and	also	other	play-
ers).	Relations	with	the	West	are	expected	to	be	continued	on	the	
principles	of	partnership.	Rhetorical	tension,	such	as	in	relations	
with	Brussels	and	Berlin	over	the	past	 two	years,	are	becoming	
the	 norm.	 Furthermore,	 following	 the	 slogan	 ‘Turkey	 is	 larger	
than	Turkey’,	actions	will	be	continued	to	reintegrate	the	Turkish	
diaspora	in	Europe	which	is	expected	to	become	an	instrument	of	
political	pressure.	One	year	since	overcoming	the	coup,	Ankara’s	
disappointment	with	the	West’s	stance	and	the	sense	of	threat	it	
poses	have	 intensified.	This	will	mean	temporary	pragmatic	co-
operation	with	the	USA	and	the	EU,	though	this	will	be	interwo-
ven	with	harsh	conflicts.	Relations	with	Russia	will	also	develop	
in	a	similar	manner.	Turkey	will	make	efforts	above	all	to	protect	
its	sovereignty	and	avoid	dependence	on	any	of	the	powers.	
After	15	July	2016	Turkey	is	still	open	to	Islam	but	this	openness	is	
accompanied	by	a	clear	determination	of	boundaries	for	Islam	it-
self.	Religion	plays	a	mobilising	role	in	Turkish	politics,	strength-
ens	the	government’s	mandate	and	has	also	been	employed	in	the	
process	of	redefining	the	national	identity.	Furthermore,	the	am-
bitions	of	making	Turkey	a	point	of	reference	for	the	Middle	East	
and	the	Islamic	world	have	not	been	abandoned.	Nevertheless,	the	
main	 enemies	 of	 the	New	Turkey	 include	 the	Gülen	Movement	
and	Islamic	State	which	draw	upon	Islam.	The	issue	of	citizenship	
for	 Syrian	 refugees	 has	 also	 been	 raised.	However,	 the	 govern-
ment	has	been	acting	cautiously	as	regards	 this	 issue,	above	all	
taking	into	account	the	interests	of	the	Turkish	public	who	have	
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been	clearly	voicing	their	views.	It	can	be	assumed	that	the	AKP	
will	not	take	any	actions	that	would	be	contrary	to	the	will	of	most	
ethnic	Turks,	but	will	rather	take	a	careful	‘pedagogical’	position	
to	soften	anti-Arab	resentments	and	prejudices	among	the	Turk-
ish	public.	
Mateusz Chudziak 
